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INCONCEIVABLE FAMILIES*
MALINDA L. SEYMORE**
Basic biology tells us that each child has no more than two biological parents,
one who supplies the egg and one who supplies the sperm. Adoption law in this
country has generally followed biology, insisting only two parents be legally
recognized for each child. Thus, every adoption begins with loss. Before a child
can be adopted, that child must first be cut off from their family of birth,
rendering the equation of adoption one of subtraction, not addition. This Article
examines the biological model of adoption that insists on mimicking the nuclear
family—erasing one set of parents and replacing them with another set of
parents, and explores the history of adoption “matching”—requiring the new
adoptive family to look identical to a biological family. But changes in family
formation, to include same-sex adoption and transracial adoption, make
conceivable other departures from biologically justified parenting, including legal
recognition of more than two parents. This Article argues that an additive,
rather than subtractive, model of adoption should prevail. In light of what we
know from psychological literature about the importance of family connections
in adoption and based on different adoption structures in France and other parts
of the world, the Article also explores some of the trepidation about more than
two parents, including the potential for conflict among multiple parents, and
suggests solutions to ameliorate some of those concerns. Families that were once
inconceivable are now flourishing; legal recognition of more than two parents
should follow.
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INTRODUCTION
When my daughter was five years old, she decided she did not want to
use the phrase, “Gotcha Day,” to celebrate the day she joined our family.1
She did not like it because to her it sounded like someone would be
jumping out of the bushes to grab her and tickle her. After discussing
some alternatives, she landed on “Forever Family Day” as the perfect
choice since we became a family forever on that day. When she was
seven, she wanted to change it again. She said that the phrase was
confusing, since her birth family was her family forever and we, her
adoptive family, were also her family forever. She never had a moment’s
doubt that she had two forever families with two sets of parents. In her
mind, adoption was addition, not subtraction. To her, a family with more
than two parents was not inconceivable.2

1. “Gotcha Day” is very commonly utilized by adoptive families to signify the day they received
the child. See John Raible, Introduction to the Special Issue on Transracial and Transnational Adoption: New
Directions in Critical Transracial Adoption Research, 21 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 111, 117 (2012)
(noting that adoption agencies and adoptive parent leaders have pushed the term to normalize
adoption). It is not universally utilized; some object to celebrating a day that is often traumatic for the
child. See Kimberly McKee, The Consumption of Adoption and Adoptees in American Middlebrow Culture,
42 BIOGRAPHY 669, 676 (2019) (describing Gotcha Day as representing social death for adoptees as
they transition from their birth countries or families to their adopted country or family). Others object
to the commodification suggested by the language. Mirah Riben, The Insensitivity of Adoption Day
Celebrations, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/theinsensitivity-of-adoption-day-celebrations_b_7207100 [https://perma.cc/8V6M-M7PD]. It is hard
terminology to avoid—even Disney has utilized it. Jessie: Gotcha Day (Disney Channel broadcast Aug.
24, 2012). Any hopes I had of avoiding it in my family ended with that Disney episode.
2. I share this story with permission from my now adult daughter.
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Basic biology tells us that each child has no more than two biological
parents, one who supplies the egg and one who supplies the sperm.3 The law
generally follows biology, insisting that only two parents be legally recognized
for each child.4 As one researcher puts it, “the dominant North American family
ideology defines a real family as the ‘nuclear family unit of a heterosexual couple
and their biological children.’”5 This is the case even where biology is not the
basis of the parent-child relationship—legal adoption6 or assisted reproduction
with donated gametes.7 As to adoption, Naomi Cahn has noted, “[e]arly
adoption law confronted the formation of families without blood ties by relying
on the paradigm of the nuclear family.”8 A nuclear family, of course, can have a
maximum of two parents. That means that before a child can be adopted, they
must lose their legal parents to have them replaced with new, adoptive legal
parents.9

3. That basic biologism argument is often made to justify denying parenthood to those who
cannot procreate, even when that parenthood is based on nonbiology adoption. Thus, those who oppose
adoption by same-sex couples may argue that they cannot parent because they cannot biologically create
children together. That biologism is also used to justify a limitation of two legal parents per child, even
when some claims of legal parenthood do not rest on biology, like adoption and assisted reproductive
technology. In this Article, I take issue with biologically based patterns for legal families, while still
recognizing that adopted children often benefit by continued connections to their biological families.
4. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 11–13 (2008)
(noting how family law enshrines the number two); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 654–55 (2008) (detailing the state interests in
bionormativity); Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 231–32
(2007) (“The assumption that every child has, or should have, two, but only two, parents remains a
core operating assumption of family law.”); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 47, 49 (2007) (exploring why more-than-two parent families are regarded as undesirable);
Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809,
851–52 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads] (advocating for disaggregating biological and social
paternity to recognize two fathers); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
879 (1984) (“The law recognizes only one set of parents for a child at any one time.”).
5. Katarina Wegar, Adoption, Family Ideology, and Social Stigma: Bias in Community Attitudes,
Adoption Research, and Practice, 49 FAM. RELS. 363, 363 (2000) (citing Margaret L. Andersen, Feminism
and the American Family Ideal, 22 J. COMPAR. FAM. STUD. 235 (1991)).
6. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1080 (2003)
[hereinafter Cahn, Perfect Substitutes] (examining how adoption has historically used the nuclear family
paradigm).
7. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth Registration in Donor-Assisted
Reproduction, in the Interest of Science and Human Rights, 48 N.M. L. REV. 416, 416 (2018) [hereinafter
Samuels, An Immodest Proposal] (“Increasingly, an individual or a couple raising a newborn child may
not be biologically related to the child.”).
8. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 6, at 1080.
9. See Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors’ Consent in Abortion and Adoption, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 148 (2013) [hereinafter Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant] (“[For adoption,]
a court must first terminate the parental rights of the birth parents before granting parental rights to
the adoptive family.”).
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With the advent of assisted reproductive technology, children might have,
in actuality, multiple biological progenitors. One person might supply an egg
to be fertilized in vitro with another person’s sperm,10 and the embryo might be
placed in a third person’s uterus for gestation,11 all with the intention that the
child will be actually parented by a fourth and possibly fifth person.12 Even as
medical science might recognize that the child created in such an arrangement
has multiple biological progenitors, the law strips away all but two in legally
recognizing who is called “parent.”13
This is true even in cases of stepparent adoption, where a child has two
legal parents already. The only way to “add” a stepparent as a legal parent is to
“subtract” one legal parent.14 It is often difficult to persuade a legal parent to
relinquish that parental connection to their child in order to permit a stepparent
to adopt, creating a near-impossible obstacle to according a stepparent legal
parenthood.15 If a stepparent could be added, without subtracting another legal
parent, the child would benefit from having a legally recognized stepparent with
rights and responsibilities, and a legal family that reflects the reality of the
child’s life.16 But three legal parents simply will not comport with the nuclear
family described by Naomi Cahn.
It is not inevitable, however, that a legal family must replicate biology.17
Courts and legislatures are recognizing that same-sex couples create a legal
family with children even when there is no possibility of biological
10. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 416. Furthermore, “[a] donated egg may even
combine genetic material from two women.” Id.
11. See id. at 417.
12. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002). Storrow notes that a child might have as
many as eight individuals who can lay claim to parentage—suggesting that in addition to multiple
biological “parents,” the spouses of gamete donors and gestational surrogates might also have a claim
to legal parenthood. Id.
13. See Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 417 (differentiating biological parentage
from social and legal parentage).
14. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents As Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 81, 85 (2006); see Margorie Engel, Stepfamily Tribulations Under United States Laws and Social
Policies, 2005 INT’L SURV. FAM. L. 529, 530 (“[American] law is not reflective of the reality of
stepfamily life.”).
15. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.10 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2022). There are
circumstances in which a court can permit a stepparent adoption without the consent of the biological
parent, but that is then a contested legal battle about termination of parental rights for cause (such as
abandonment) and may be even more difficult than soliciting consent from the biological father to the
stepparent adoption. Id. § 2.10[3].
16. See Mahoney, supra note 14, at 85 (advocating for legally recognizing the stepparent-child
relationship).
17. See Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 417 (noting how birth records for donated
gametes may increasingly be works of fiction).
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procreation.18 Same-sex married couples are being given the benefit of the
marital presumption—that a child born or conceived during a legal marriage is
legally the child of both—even when biology makes it impossible.19 The entire
premise of adoption is that an adoptive family is a legal family like all others,
despite the lack of biological ties.20
It is quite conceivable, then, to decouple legal parenthood from biology
and thus have a legally cognizable family with more than two legal parents.
France has a centuries-old history of adoption as addition, not subtraction.21
Since 1804, France has recognized adoption simple, a form of “additive filiation,”
where a person is made legally a member of one family without cutting off ties
from the biological family.22 California has recently passed legislation to clarify
that a child can have more than two parents,23 which could open the door to
adoption that maintains parental connection between adopted children and
their birth parents.
This Article argues that more states should follow California’s lead,
accepting that children can have more than two parents, that legal recognition
of the reality of children’s lives allows them to maintain connections to all
parents, including birth parents, and have all parents as a social safety net of
support. Allowing for more than two parents provides for an equation where
adoption is addition, not subtraction. Children’s needs for connection and
continuity to previous caregivers, and their need to understand their biological
18. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1185 (2016) [hereinafter NeJaime, Marriage Equality] (providing background on parental recognition
for same-sex couples).
19. Id. at 1248–49.
20. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, § 1.01[1] (“Upon issuance of a judicial
decree of adoption, the legal relationship of the adopted child with its biological parents and other
members of its original family is completely severed. Adopted children become, for all legal purposes,
the children of their adoptive parents.”).
21. See Jean-François Mignot, “Simple” Adoption in France: Revival of an Old Institution (1804–
2007), 56 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE 365, 365 (2015) [hereinafter Mignot, Simple Adoption
in France] (describing how France has two types of adoption, one of which does not break the ties
between the adoptee and their family of origin).
22. Id.
23. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601(c) (Westlaw through Ch. 14 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (defining parentchild relationship but not precluding “a finding that a child has a parent and child relationship with
more than two parents”). Maine has done the same. ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1891(5) (2022) (recognizing
a “de facto parent . . . does not disestablish the parentage of any other parent”). There are also a few
cases where courts have recognized three legal parents. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super
118, ¶¶ 25–26, 923 A.2d 473, 481–82 (2007) (holding that a lesbian couple and the sperm donor-friend
who were raising the child together were all legal parents, and thus all were obligated to pay child
support); see also Courtney G. Joslin & Douglas NeJaime, Multi-Parent Families, Real and Imagined, 90
FORDHAM L. REV. 2561, 2575–78 (2022) (using empirical data from West Virginia to argue that courts
have accommodated more-than-two-parent families).
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beginnings in order to form a healthy sense of self, justify the recognition of
birth parents as well as adoptive parents as a child’s legal parents. Because legal
parents are the supportive social safety net for children it makes little sense to
erase those who seek to continue their connection to children. While there has
been some discussion in legal literature of more-than-two parent regimes in
terms of de facto parenting,24 there has not been an explicit focus on birth
parents and adoptive parents sharing parental rights.
Part I of this Article examines the current model of adoption that insists
on mimicking the nuclear family by erasing one set of parents to replace with
another set of parents and explores the history of adoption “matching,” where
the new adoptive family was made to look identical to a biological family even
to the point of matching social class, religion, hair color and texture, etc. Part I
also discusses the role of secrecy in adoption: the erase-and-replace model relies
on secrecy, to the extent of issuing amended birth certificates showing the
adoptive parents as the birthers of the child, allowing the illusion of a
biologically created nuclear family. This part also outlines early practice in
stepparent adoption confirming the erase-and-replace model of adoptive family
creation. Part II explores how changes in family formation, to include same-sex
adoption and transracial adoption, have made inroads in the subtract-andreplace model of replicating biological families. As families quite conspicuously
not based in biology proliferate, they make conceivable other departures from
biologically justified parenting. Part III presents an argument that the additive,
rather than the subtractive, model of adoption should prevail nationally, in light
of what we know from psychological literature about the importance of family
connections in adoption and based on different adoption structures in France
and other parts of the world. Part IV explores some of the trepidation about
more than two parents, including the potential for conflict among parents, by
suggesting that lessons from collaborative lawyering in divorce and alternative
dispute resolution might ameliorate some of those concerns. Finally, in Part V,
the Article sets out some concluding thoughts on adoption as addition rather
than subtraction, with some suggestions for the parameters of legal changes to
permit more than two parents.

24. See Appleton, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the typicality of two parents in family law); Baker,
supra note 4, at 655 (discussing the core aspects of bionormativity); Dowd, supra note 4, at 231–32
(emphasizing how family law relies on the assumption children have two, and only two, parents);
Kessler, supra note 4, at 49 (exploring why more-than-two parent families are seen as undesirable);
Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 4, at 851–52; Bartlett, supra note 4, at 879.
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I. REPLICATING THE NUCLEAR FAMILY IN ADOPTION
For adoption to mimic the biological family, as it was once widely believed
to be necessary, it required two components: (1) secrecy to make the biological
family “disappear,” and (2) matching the adopted child and adoptive parents in
all respects to make the adoptive family appear “as if” a biological family.25 Even
in stepparent adoption, the imperative to mimic a biological family existed.
A.

Secrecy Erases the Biological Family

Secrecy has not always been a part of adoption. Before World War II,
most adopted children were older and knew the identity and whereabouts of
their biological parents.26 Often, biological parents and adoptive parents made
the adoption arrangements on their own, without an intermediary, and thus
knew each other’s identity and whereabouts.27 Secrecy was introduced by
progressive reformers to keep birth parents away from their children placed for
adoption.28
Reformers of the era believed that in order to save children from poverty
it was necessary to remove them from their impoverished families, rather than
seeking to lift entire families from poverty.29 The infamous Charles Loring
Brace of the Orphan Trains shipped children by rail from cities in the Northeast
to rural areas in the Midwest to remove them from what reformers believed to
be the pernicious influences of impoverished parents.30 Reformers seeking to
“save” children from poverty were concerned that birth parents would look to
25. Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative
Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1995) (“The adoption paradigm that has
dominated most of this century is one of exclusivity, secrecy, and transposition, through which the
adoptee—usually an infant—is taken from one family and given to another, with all vestiges of the first
family removed.”).
26. Malinda L. Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163,
168–69 (2015) [hereinafter Seymore, International Adoption]; see E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS:
SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 88 (1998) [hereinafter CARP, FAMILY
MATTERS] (“Child-placing experts routinely recommended that all adopted children be informed.”);
DEBORAH H. SIEGEL & SUSAN LIVINGSTON SMITH, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST.,
OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: FROM SECRECY AND STIGMA TO KNOWLEDGE AND CONNECTIONS 10
(2012) (explaining how sealing original birth certificates did not become common until the middle of
the twentieth century).
27. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 168–69; CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra
note 26, at 197; see also SIEGEL & LIVINGSTON SMITH, supra note 26, at 10 (providing a historical
perspective on adoption practices in America).
28. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 169.
29. Id. at 169–70.
30. MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN AMERICA 181 (1992); see
RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE 33–36 (1990) (explaining the history of child saving in the nineteenth century).
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reunite with their children and would, thereby, undo all the good work of saving
the children.31 “Progressive Era social workers began to include in
relinquishment forms signed by birth parents promises not to seek out the child,
to learn the child’s location, or to interfere in any way with the child or adoptive
parents.”32 In the Orphan Train documentary, a survivor describes how the
envelope with his biological father’s address was taken from him so that he could
not inform his father of his final destination.33
By 1938, “disappearing” the birth parents became not just a standard
practice in American adoption but official policy. It was then that the influential
Child Welfare League of America formalized the requirement that “the identity
of the adopting parents should be kept from the natural parents.”34 By 1948, a
majority of states had legislation sealing adoption records.35 Birth parents were
further erased as states began to provide “amended birth certificates” to
adoptive parents, where the birth parents’ names would be removed from the
child’s birth certificate and replaced with the names of the adoptive parents.36
The cumulative effect of these practices was that “[b]y the mid-1960s, the
confidentiality regime had transformed into a secrecy regime, with birth parents
denied information about the adoptive parents and the child’s whereabouts,
with adoption records sealed to all, and with records of original birth certificates
also sealed.”37
Secrecy was seen as the perfect solution; it allowed adopted children to be
“treated as if they had been born into the adoptive family.”38 The practice of
secrecy created an “alternative family,” where it was “as if the birth mother had
never borne this child, as if the adoptive mother herself had.”39 As

31. CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 26, at 103; see Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 17
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 173 (2006) (describing parents who placed children in child-saving
organizations); Elizabeth J. Samuels, Surrender and Subordination: Birth Mothers and Adoption Law
Reform, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 33, 53 (2013) (“[A] key purpose of sealing records . . . was to protect
adoptive families from interference by birth parents.”).
32. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 169–70; E. WAYNE CARP, ADOPTION
POLITICS: BASTARD NATION AND BALLOT INITIATIVE 7 (2004) [hereinafter CARP, ADOPTION
POLITICS].
33. See American Experience: The Orphan Trains (PBS television broadcast Nov. 27, 1995).
34. JANINE M. BAER, GROWING IN THE DARK: ADOPTION SECRECY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 72 (2004).
35. See CARP, ADOPTION POLITICS, supra note 32, at 9.
36. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access
to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376–77 (2001) [hereinafter Samuels, The Idea of Adoption].
37. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 173.
38. ELINOR B. ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE: THE CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES THROUGH THE YEARS 10 (1992).
39. Id.
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anthropologist Judith Modell notes, “As-if-begotten informs everyday language
about adoption in the United States.”40 From “paper pregnant” prospective
adoptive parents,41 to adoption photo shoots with globes or beach balls in place
of the pregnant belly,42 to “Born in my Heart” memorabilia,43 the language of
procreation infuses adoption.
The erasure of the birth family allowed for “a perfect and complete
substitute for creating a family through childbirth . . . .”44 Professor Annette
Appell observes, “the adoption paradigm became one of fictive birth that
substituted the adoptive parents for the birth parents.”45 The new family,
therefore, had to mimic biology.

40. JUDITH S. MODELL, A SEALED AND SECRET KINSHIP: THE CULTURE OF POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ADOPTION 6 (2002).
41. To be “paper pregnant” is to have filed the necessary paperwork to adopt; the waiting period
for a match is the paper pregnancy. ‘Paper Pregnancy’—What You Need To Know, AM. ADOPTION NEWS
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.americanadoptions.com/blog/paper-pregnancy-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/7W85-TYCL]. In this blog, the prospective adoptive parent includes a photo
mimicking the typical pregnancy photo, with the paper file replacing the pregnant belly. Paper
Pregnant | April Self Portrait, ABBY GRACE BLOG (Apr. 30, 2019), https://abbygraceblog.com/paperpregnant/ [https://perma.cc/YZT8-5PD5]. One may also buy the “paper pregnancy” t-shirt. Paper
Pregnant Shirt, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/market/paper_pregnant_shirt [https://perma.cc/5UNURDH5].
42. Adjoa Adoptions, I’m Paper Pregnant—Adoption Announcement Ideas, PINTEREST,
https://www.pinterest.com/hansen1161/im-paper-pregnant-adoption-announcement-ideasadjoa/ [http
s://perma.cc/RK8H-TUTT].
43. The memorabilia quote stems from a poem often beloved of adoptive parents:
Not flesh of my flesh
Nor bone of my bone,
But still miraculously my own.
Never forget for a single minute,
You didn’t grow under my heart
But in it.
– Fleur Conkling Heyliger
Adoption
Poem
by
Fleur
Conkling
Heyliger,
FRIENDS
IN
ADOPTION, https://www.friendsinadoption.org/adoption-quotes-poems/adoption-poem-by-fleur-con
kling-heyliger/ [https://perma.cc/PS4G-BAPP]. Memorabilia featuring the sentiment include: a “Born
In My Heart” charm, “Born in My Heart” Adoption Charm, JAMES AVERY,
https://www.jamesavery.com/products/born-in-my-heart-adoption-charm [https://perma.cc/JD7CJ9Q4]; “Born in My Heart” wall hangings, Not Flesh of My Flesh—Fleur Conkling Heyliger Adoption Quote,
ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/listing/109410498/not-flesh-of-my-flesh-fleur-conkling [https://perma.c
c/CB8P-BANM]; and children’s books, Born in My Heart Paperback, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Born-My-Heart-Dixie-Phillips/dp/1951545079 [https://perma.cc/4BEAVJF9].
44. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption, supra note 36, at 406–07.
45. Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: Heteronormativity, Same-Sex
Parenting, and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 289, 300–01 (2008) [hereinafter Appell, The
Endurance of Biological Connection].
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Matching Replaces the Biological Family

Adoption has long been viewed as an “imitation of the ‘real [i.e.,
biological] family.’”46 Social workers in the middle twentieth-century believed
that successful adoptive families were those that best mimicked biology.47 Social
workers sometimes described their role of family creating as “playing God,”
emphasizing that they were, in creating adoptive families, doing what God did
in creating biological families.48 Adoptive parents “wanted desperately for their
family’s status to remain unknown in order to conform to America’s cultural
preference for ‘blood’ families.”49
Matching children and parents became the method by which the biological
family was replicated so as to ensure the happiness of adoptive parents and
children.50 “This included attempts to match people of the same ethnic,
religious, and racial origins, so that the family would look like a biologically
formed family.”51 Children who would “fit” in their adoptive families, in terms
of “physical characteristics, intellectual capacities, temperament, and religious
and ethnic affiliation,” would better assimilate and be what social workers
promised: “[A] child ‘who might have been born to you.’”52 Agencies would go
so far as to match not just race or ethnicity, but also body type, hair, and eye
color.53 Adoption historian Ellen Herman found that adoption home studies
invariably included sections describing the physical appearance of adoptive
parents, birth parents and children in great detail, including skin tone and hair
texture.54 Adoptive parents, in describing the child they wished to adopt,
“explained their tastes in racial, ethnic and national terms.”55 One adoptive
family rejected a child because her coloring was darker than theirs; another

46. Jehnna Irene Hanan, Comment, The Best Interest of the Child: Eliminating Discrimination in the
Screening of Adoptive Parents, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 167, 171 (1997).
47. Brian Paul Gill, Adoption Agencies and the Search for the Ideal Family, 1918–1965, in ADOPTION
IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 160, 162 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002); Appell, The
Endurance of Biological Connection, supra note 45, at 289.
48. Gill, supra note 47, at 163.
49. CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 26, at 126; see also ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY
DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 122 (2008) [hereinafter
HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN] (“Successful matching erased itself, making the social design of
adoption invisible.”).
50. Cahn, Perfect Substitutes, supra note 6, at 1148–49.
51. Id. at 1149; see also MODELL, supra note 40, at 7.
52. JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
MOTHERHOOD, 1851–1950, at 137 (2000); see also BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 52 (2002) (describing adoption as the “as if begotten” family).
53. BEREBITSKY, supra note 52, at 137.
54. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 123–24.
55. Id. at 124.
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adoptive mother said she was repulsed by a child’s fair complexion and green
eyes.56 Another family explained, though they were Jewish, they did not want a
child who was “heavy Jewish looking.”57
Racial lines were maintained in adoption so rigorously that prior to the
1950s, the question of transracial adoption “was hardly ever posed, simply
because the very idea of interracial adoption was virtually inconceivable.”58
Adopting a child of the “wrong” race was grounds for undoing the adoption:
“Kentucky passed a law specifying that if ‘within a five-year period after an
adoption is finalized a child reveals traits of ethnological ancestry different from
those of the adoptive parents . . . the adoption can be canceled.’”59 Indeed,
adoption agencies did not simply permit adoptions to be undone when the
child’s race was revealed as different from the adoptive parents, many insisted
that the adoption must be canceled.60 Louisiana justified its race-matching
requirement as mimicking biology: “It was patently ‘unnatural,’ the state
maintained, for white parents to beget a black child, or black parents to beget a
white one.”61 Adoption could do no more than replicate biology.
Less visible markers were also grounds for matching, like intellectual
capacity, class, and religion. Arnold Gesell, a Yale University psychologist,
advocated for testing very young children to determine their level of
intelligence, and then taking care that “dull” children were not placed with
educated families and “bright” children placed in homes with little intellectual
promise.62 That focus on intellectual capacity served as a proxy to preserve class
structures as well.63 Children matched with highly educated parents should have
the capacity to avoid disappointing them, and “ensure (as much as possible
according to the scientific thought of the day) that a family’s social standing
would be maintained through the subsequent generations.”64 Social class
matching could be an inevitable by-product of circumstances—a physician
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 387 (2003); see also HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 238 (noting the near
complete consensus against transracial adoption prior to the 1960s).
59. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 388 (noting that Missouri had a similar law).
60. See HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 129. In one case, when an adoption
agency discovered a child had an African American father, the agency begged the birth mother to take
the child back so as not to risk a white family adopting the child and later discovering the mixed race.
Id.
61. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 389.
62. BEREBITSKY, supra note 52, at 139–40.
63. Id. at 140.
64. Id.
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might match the child of an unmarried patient to another patient desiring a
child, and by virtue of sharing the same doctor they would have similar social
backgrounds.65 Some agencies catered to well-to-do unwed mothers and college
students, and placed their children with other well-to-do and college-educated
clients.66
Religious matching often had little to do with “fit” between child and
prospective parents, as did other matching factors, but was motivated by
religious protection and driven by religious groups themselves concerned with
“predatory Protestantism.” This referred to the practice of Protestant child
welfare organizations of separating children of minority religions (primarily
Catholicism) from their communities and placing them in Protestant homes.67
Religious matching “was more likely than any other to be codified in adoption
law.”68
Sometimes religious matching and matching on other axes, such as race,
could conflict. One notorious episode involved Catholic children taken from
New York City to be placed in Catholic homes in the Arizona Territory in
1904.69 The white Catholic children were placed in the homes of Mexican
Catholics, “a racialized category that jeopardized the children’s entitlement to
whiteness.”70 Furious white neighbors forcibly removed the children from the
Mexican homes and placed them in families where their races matched but their
religions often did not.71 When the Catholic Church sued for the return of the
children in their care, they lost every battle in every court, including before the
U.S. Supreme Court in New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti.72 While the
Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus petition was not appropriate in this
case, the petitioner in the case argued it was not in the best interest of the
children, being “white, Caucasian,” to be in the custody of a “Mexican Indian,”
who “by reason of his race, mode of living, habits and education,” was “unfit to
have the custody, care and education of the child.”73 “Ideally, matching was a

65. Id. at 141.
66. Id.
67. Ellen Herman, The Difference Difference Makes: Justine Wise Polier and Religious Matching in
Twentieth-Century Child Adoption, 10 RELIGION & AM. CULTURE 57, 63–64 (2000) [hereinafter
Herman, The Difference Difference Makes].
68. MELOSH, supra note 52, at 76.
69. See LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 18–19 (2001).
70. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 126.
71. GORDON, supra note 69, at 1–2.
72. 203 U.S. 429 (1906).
73. Id. at 435.
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seamless operation in which axes of identity all pointed in the same direction,”74
but when race and religion conflicted, race clearly trumped religion.
Matching, according to the thought of the day, not only promised better
assimilation into the family, it also provided invisibility for adoption.75 Without
matching, an adoptive family might expect that others would frequently point
out differences between their families and those created by biology.76 Adoptive
families modeled closely on biological families could avoid the appearance of
difference—of being “less than” biological families.77 “According to the
‘matching’ paradigm that has governed modern adoption, adults who acquire
children born to others must look, feel, and behave as if they had given birth
themselves.”78 It was crucial that adoptive families mimicked biology.
Replicating biology in an adoptive family also presented problems with
stepparent families, with two biological parents cleaved by divorce and a third
person marrying one of the parents. More than two parents were not a biological
family, so family status was problematic for the stepparent. The law had a
simple way to solve the problem: erase and replace one parent, the noncustodial
biological parent, netting the biologically mandated two parents for the child.
C.

Stepparent Adoption ≠ Nuclear Family

Erasure was difficult with stepparent families, where the child was often
older and was aware of his or her biological progenitors. Nonetheless,
stepparent adoption sought to mimic the pattern of other adoptions in the eraseand-replace of at least one biological parent. A stepparent family is a nearnuclear family, because it contains at least one member of the child’s biological,
parental dyad, “yet because it does not contain both of the child’s natural
parents and indeed may threaten the status of the noncustodial parent, the
stepfamily challenges traditional family-based doctrines of parental rights.”79
However, formation of “new” families after divorce still sought to recreate the
former nuclear, biological family.80 Stepparent adoption, therefore, is permitted
74. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 127.
75. MELOSH, supra note 52, at 52 (noting that matching abetted secrecy).
76. BEREBITSKY, supra note 52, at 138.
77. Id. at 137.
78. Herman, The Difference Difference Makes, supra note 67, at 57; see also MELOSH, supra note 52,
at 52 (2002) (describing adoption as the “as if begotten” family); Susan Ayres, The Hand That Rocks the
Cradle: How Children’s Literature Reflects Motherhood, Identity, and International Adoption, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 315, 322–23 (2004) (noting the “as if” narrative of adoption).
79. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 912.
80. Elizabeth J. Aulik, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C. DAVIS L.
Rev. 604, 607 (1979) (“Once formed, a stepfamily may prefer to think of itself as just another nuclear
family.”).
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only if the parental rights of at least one biological parent are terminated first.81
In order to add a stepparent, we must first subtract a biological parent.
At one time in American law, a stepparent could only adopt a child who
was “available for adoption,”82 and for a child to be available for adoption, the
child could have NO legal parents. So, for a stepparent adoption to happen,
both the custodial and noncustodial parents would relinquish parental rights,83
and then the custodial parent would adopt their biological child together with
the stepparent.84 Not surprisingly, there was great reluctance on the part of the
custodial parent to relinquish parental rights in the fervent hope that the trial
court would recreate those parental rights by approving an adoption.85 Thus,
legislatures began to create stepparent exceptions that allowed the custodial
parent to retain parental rights while allowing adoption by a stepparent married
to that custodial parent.86 But that stepparent could only be added to the family
81. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 85.
82. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 379–81 (Neb. 2002).
83. This history is discernable by analyzing second-parent adoption by same-sex couples, who
often tried to fit within stepparent adoption statutes to avoid complete termination of parental rights
by the custodial parent. See generally In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); Adoptions of
B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995);
In re Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 374. State statutes at the time also mandated termination of all parental
rights before a child could be adopted by a stepparent. See, e.g., Texas Family Code Annotated
§ 16.03(b) (1984), which said “no petition for adoption of a child may be considered unless there has
been a decree terminating the parent-child relationship as to each living parent of the child,” but now
reads,
(b) A child residing in this state may be adopted if:
(1) the parent-child relationship as to each living parent of the child has been
terminated or a suit for termination is joined with the suit for adoption;
(2) the parent whose rights have not been terminated is presently the spouse of
the petitioner and the proceeding is for a stepparent adoption.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Westlaw through the end of the 2021 Reg. and Called Sess. of the
87th Legislature).
84. In re Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 381–82.
85. Id. at 387 (Gerrard, J., dissenting) (noting the considerable risk a relinquishing biological
parent faces that a judge will deny the joint adoption by her and the second parent, thus losing all rights
in her child).
86. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, § 2.10 (2021) (“State statutes generally
provide that the consent of a custodial parent to the adoption of a child by a stepparent does not relieve
the custodial parent of responsibilities for the support and care of the child, nor deprive the custodial
parent of any parental rights.”); see, e.g., 1 NY CLS DESK EDITION CIVIL PRACTICE ANNUAL
§ 117(1)(d) (2022) (“When a birth or adoptive parent, having lawful custody of a child, marries or
remarries and consents that the stepparent may adopt such child, such consent shall not relieve the
parent so consenting of any parental duty toward such child nor shall such consent or the order of
adoption affect the rights of such consenting spouse and such adoptive child.”); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 162.001 (Westlaw) (“A child residing in this state may be adopted if: . . . the parent whose
rights have not been terminated is presently the spouse of the petitioner and the proceeding is for a
stepparent adoption.”).
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if the noncustodial biological parent was subtracted—his or her parental rights
had to be terminated.
Divorce, remarriage, stepparent adoption, and the Brady Bunch blended
family all began to show how families existed outside the mold of biology. In
addition, the growth of transracial adoption, creating conspicuous families
clearly not biologically related, and gay and lesbian parenting, where biology
was obviously not the basis of family, began to break down notions of family
based on biology.87 Families that were once inconceivable became common and
conspicuous. Research on adoptee identity formation, particularly for
transracial adoptees, also showed the importance of recognizing biological
parents rather than erasing them.88 It no longer seemed imperative to erase
biological progenitors when the “new” family did not mimic the “as if born to”
model.89 The next section explores how these changes have revolutionized views
of adoption, while the law lags behind to insist that adoptive families still mimic
a biological dyad.
II. “NEW” FAMILIES NOT RELIANT ON BIOLOGY
There is a veritable cottage industry of decrying the death of the nuclear
family.90 Single parenthood and divorce in particular come under scrutiny in
concerns about the demise of the nuclear family. But in adoption, it is transracial
adoption and same-sex adoption that receive scrutiny because they transgress
norms of the biological basis of family. And in adoption, if the family is not
created through biology, it has long been a truism that it should at least look as
if it were. With the decline of matching in adoption coupled with the growth
of transracial adoption and same-sex adoption, parenthood has become
increasingly divorced from biology and attempts to mimic biology.

87. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 90–121.
88. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 122–60.
89. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 38–45.
90. For examples of works discussing and analyzing the death of the nuclear family, see Bartlett,
supra note 4; David Popenoe, American Family Decline, 1960–1990: A Review and Appraisal, 55 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 527 (1993); Clem Brooks, Religious Influence and the Politics of Family Decline
Concern: Trends, Sources, and U.S. Political Behavior, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 191 (2002); NATASHA
ZARETSKY, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE FEAR OF NATIONAL
DECLINE, 1968–1980 (2007); Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of
Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403 (2010).
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Transracial Adoption and the End of Matching

As Randall Kennedy notes, “most jurisdictions prior to the 1960s took for
granted the inadvisability of black-white interracial adoptions . . . .”91 It was so
commonplace an understanding that only two states bothered to legislate
against it.92 Even at the height of the matching era, however, there were
dissenters. Historian Ellen Herman profiles three of them in her book, Kinship
by Design: Judge Justine Wise Polier, who was judge of a New York domestic
relations court starting in 1935 and fought against religious matching;93 Pearl
Buck, the well-known author of The Good Earth, who adopted seven mixed-race
children between the 1920s and 1950s and even started her own adoption agency
dedicated to “children considered unadoptable because of their mixed
heritage”;94 and Helen Doss, whose adoption memoir, The Family Nobody
Wanted, valorized the “one-family U.N.” she created through transracial
adoption.95 As Herman notes:
After midcentury the lessons of the Holocaust and the pluralistic
formulations of identity and solidarity that accompanied the civil rights
revolution made their mark on the adoption world. Public figures,
including Justine Wise Polier and Pearl Buck, insisted that matching was
antithetical to Americanism long before diversity and multiculturalism
became keywords in American political culture . . . . Claims about
children’s adoptability and the importance of resemblance consequently
appeared to be not simply antiquated but unjust.96
Despite these critiques of matching on racial grounds, there were very few
formal adoption placements of children of color, whether in same-race homes
or transracially.97 There were only a few hundred transracial adoptions of Black
91. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 387–88.
92. See id. at 388.
93. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 205–09.
94. Id. at 205–12; LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 151–52 (2012).
95. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 205–12.
96. Id. at 227.
97. See id. at 229–30 (“Adoption was ‘the least likely of all child welfare services to be extended
to Black children.’” (quoting ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF
THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 72 (1972))). Informal adoption
of Black children by Black parents is quite common, however. Nerissa LeBlanc Gillum, Review of
Research on Black Families Who Formally Adopted Black Children, 92 FAMS. SOC’Y 324, 324 (2011) (noting
that informal adoption is common practice in Black families, from the time of slavery to today). Black
families may not formally adopt because adoption agencies usually do not seek to recruit Black families
and do not have Black staff who might more fairly evaluate Black families for suitability. Kerry
Woodward, Marketing Black Babies Versus Recruiting Black Families: The Racialized Strategies Private
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children per year by the 1960s,98 but even that small number dropped by the
mid-1970s after the National Association of Black Social Workers (“NABSW”)
condemned transracial adoption in 1972 as genocide:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in
foster care or for adoption. Black children belong physically,
psychologically and culturally [in Black families] in order that they
receive the total sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of
their future . . . . Black children in white homes are cut off from the
healthy development of themselves as Black people.99
While many decry the effect of this statement on transracial adoption,100
it must be recognized that there was little evidence of a robust trend of
transracial adoption before this position statement was promulgated.101 Randall
Kennedy, who strongly argues that the statement was powerfully influential,
presents very low figures of transracial adoption of Black children before and
after the NABSW statement: 733 such adoptions in 1968, 1,447 in 1969, 2,284
in 1970 (the 1972 statement), and then 1,091 adoptions in 1973 and 747 in
1974.102 While there is undoubtedly a decline, the number of transracial
adoption of Black children by white families represents a tiny fraction of overall
adoptions at that time. The overall number of adopted children in 1968 was
166,000 and that number dropped to 138,000 in 1974.103 Indeed, there was a

Adoption Agencies Use To Find Homes for Black Babies, 2 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 482, 487 (2016)
(“[P]rivate adoption agencies have done a poor job of attracting and serving Black and other prospective
parents of color, including mixed-race couples.”). Thus, transracial adoption usually involves white
adoptive parents with children of color; the number of Black families adopting white children is
extremely small.
98. See KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 396 (stating that in 1968, just 733 Black children were adopted
by white families).
99. Id. at 393 (quoting NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS, POSITION STATEMENT ON
TRANS-RACIAL ADOPTIONS (1972)). Laura Briggs provides a counternarrative to Kennedy’s, arguing
that the purpose of the NABSW statement was not “primarily an attack on white parents’ skills” to
parent Black children, but rather “an effort to keep black families together in the context of coercive
separation of black children from their families dating back to slavery.” BRIGGS, supra note 94, at 28–
29.
100. Ellen Herman notes: “For thirty years, commentaries on transracial adoption have unfailingly
identified the NABSW position paper as a powerful intervention in the debate and credited it with
preventing adoptions that might have occurred otherwise.” HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note
49, at 250.
101. Id. (“Racial fears among whites had always inhibited transracial adoptions, of course, and the
number of African American children adopted by whites was never large.”).
102. KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 396; see also BRIGGS, supra note 94, at 35–37 (noting the low
numbers of adoption of Black children in same-race and cross-race adoptions).
103. William Robert Johnson, Historical Statistics on Adoption in the United States, Plus Statistics on
Child
Population
and
Welfare
(Aug.
5,
2017),
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/adoptionstats.html [https://perma.cc/8SVV-4AD7].
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drop in the number of children overall in the United States between 1968 and
1974.104 This suggests that the drop in transracial adoption was consistent with
general trends, rather than attributable to the NABSW statement. At that time,
there was not a large groundswell of adoptive families seeking to adopt outside
the paradigm of matching, especially across the Black/white racial divide. “The
NABSW statement was influential, but its influence has been exaggerated. The
NABSW was never able to translate its opposition to transracial adoption into
law.”105
Further, the NABSW position had little effect on the adoption of other
children of color by white families. “Asian children placed in white families
were the adoptees who made transracial adoption a conspicuous social issue for
the first time.”106 The adoption of Asian children from Japan, Korea, and
Vietnam was a response to American wars in those locales, and “were
spearheaded by military and civilian families who responded to humanitarian
appeals by making foreign children (some of them fathered by members of the
U.S. armed services) their own.”107 In 1957, there were 10,900 international
adoptions.108 The large number from South Korea109 far outstripped that year’s
transracial adoption of Black children by white families. Between 1968 and 1975,
immigrant orphans admitted to the United States for the purposes of adoption
increased by 350%.110
As the demand for adoptable children began to outstrip the supply of
white children, attitudes toward transracial adoption began to change. Some
prospective adoptive parents sued agencies and states when denied the ability
to adopt a child of a different race, alleging that they were the subject of
discrimination because of their race.111 There were concerns about the number
of Black children in foster care and the length of time they spent there, and
some argued it was because available white families were prevented from

104. See id.
105. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 251.
106. Id. at 239.
107. Id.
108. Johnson, supra note 103.
109. See HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 220.
110. Id. at 252.
111. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton City Dep’t of Fam. & Child.’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1200–01
(5th Cir. 1977); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Moorehead, 600
N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). Note that in 1994, the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, discussed in
text accompanying notes 115–18, was passed, limiting the use of race in adoption and foster placement
decisions.
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adopting them.112 Laura Briggs argues that the real reason was not a dearth of
adoptive placements, but rather the lower rates of family reunification for Black
children.113 But by 1994, Congress passed the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act
(“MEPA”).114 MEPA prohibited adoption and foster agencies that received
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race in adoptive and foster
placements.115 At least, race could not be the sole factor in the placement
decision, nor could race considerations delay or deny a child’s placement.116
MEPA did not achieve its intended purpose of preventing race matching,
however:
As Senators Carol Moseley-Braun and Howard Metzenbaum, the
sponsors of the original legislation, stated in separate MEPA-related
articles, the wording of MEPA did not allow race to be the sole factor in
rejecting pre-adoptive parents, but it did allow race to be considered in
adoption placements. Thus, rather than achieving the congressionally
intended purpose of resolving the transracial adoption debate by limiting
the basis for considering race, MEPA fueled the flames of the debate. In
addition, there was evidence that, following the passage of MEPA, race
matching in adoptions continued.117
The Act was strengthened in 1996 with the passage of new legislation that
provided an enforcement mechanism—funding reductions for MEPA
violations—and explicit language prohibiting all consideration of race in
adoption.118
Transracial adoptions today represent a far more robust portion of
adoptions than in the 1960s. In one study, transracial adoptions represented 21%
to 24% of adoptions between 2000 and 2012.119 In a government report based
on the 2007 National Survey of Adoptive Parents, 40% of adoptions were

112. See KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 393; Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The
Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (1991).
113. See BRIGGS, supra note 94, at 119 (“The question of the race of adoptive parents was essentially
a red herring if the issue was getting children out of foster care—black children were spending a
disproportionate amount of time in foster care because TANF and the moral panic around crack were
separating them from their unmarried mothers as a matter of federal and state policy.”).
114. Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 622).
115. Id. § 553.
116. See CYNTHIA HAWKINS DEBOSE, MASTERING ADOPTION LAW AND POLICY 74 (2015).
117. Id. at 75.
118. Act of Aug. 20, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903–04 (1996) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
119. Elisha Marr, U.S. Transracial Adoption Trends in the 21st Century, 20 ADOPTION Q. 222, 234
(2017).
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transracial.120 In another study, data revealed that “90% of Asian adoptees, 64%
of multiracial adoptees, 62% of Hispanic adoptees, and 55% of [B]lack adoptees”
were being raised in transracial placements in 2011.121
With the debates about transracial adoption, as well as the growth in
numbers, there is increased awareness among transracial adoptive families of
the need to address racial identity development—though there are many
disagreements amongst parents about how to do so.122 Adoptive parents may
seek to instill racial pride by providing dolls and books with characters who look
like the adopted child.123 Children may attend cultural activities connected to
their racial or ethnic identities.124 Organizations have sprung up for transracial
adoptive families, where children can interact with other children who share
their ethnic, racial, cultural, and adoptive background.125 Some international
adoptive families take homeland tours designed to introduce the adopted child
to their home country and provide an experience where they are no longer in
the minority.126 Adoptive parents may ensure that their children have adult role
models of their race or ethnicity.127 Some seek to prepare their children to face
racism in the future.128 These activities are very different from earlier days of
120. SHARON VANDIVERE, KARIN MALM & LAURA RADEL, ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK
BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS 14 fig.7 (2009).
121. Nicholas Zill, The Changing Face of Adoption in the United States, INST. FAM. STUD. (Aug. 8,
2017), https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-changing-face-of-adoption-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc
/QVX5-HDWN].
122. See Ellen E. Pinderhughes, Jessica A.K. Matthews, Xian Zhang & Judith C. Scott, Unpacking
Complexities in Ethnic-Racial Socialization in Transracial Adoptive Families: A Process-Oriented
Transactional System, 33 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 493, 494–95 (2021); Caitlin Killian & Nikki
Khanna, Beyond Color-Blind and Color-Conscious: Approaches to Racial Socialization Among Parents of
Transracially Adopted Children, 68 FAM. RELS. 260, 262 (2019).
123. See Robin L. Soster, Kelly L. Tian, Alexander S. Rose & Randall L. Rose, Consuming To Be
Good: Therapeutic Ideology and Transracial Adoptive Mothers, 53 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 201, 215 (2019).
124. See Pinderhughes, supra note 122, at 499; Maya Blair & Meina Liu, Ethnically Chinese and
Culturally American: Exploring Bicultural Identity Negotiation and Co-Cultural Communication of ChineseAmerican Female Adoptees, 13 J. INT’L & INTERCULTURAL COMMC’N 347, 348 (2020).
125. See, e.g., FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN FROM CHINA, GREATER N.Y., https://fccny.org/
[https://perma.cc/K66W-NXN3] (supporting Chinese adoptees, their families, and their friends);
ASIA FAMILIES, https://www.asiafamilies.org/ [https://perma.cc/2ER6-8H5M] (supporting adoptees
from Korea); PACT: AN ADOPTION ALLIANCE, https://www.pactadopt.org/home.asp
[https://perma.cc/UN6E-F9X9] (supporting adopted children of color and their families); see also
Ravinder Barn, Transracial Adoption: White American Adoptive Mothers’ Constructions of Social Capital in
Raising Their Adopted Children, 41 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 2522, 2529 (2018) (noting the importance
white adoptive mothers placed on socialization through relationships with families “like them”).
126. Sandra Sun-Ah Ponting, Birth Country Travel and Adoptee Identity, 93 ANNALS TOURISM
RSCH. 1, 2 (2022).
127. See Barn, supra note 125, at 2531–32.
128. It seems that fewer white adoptive parents seek to address racism, even when they address
racial and cultural identity formation. See CHRISTINE WARD GAILEY, BLUE-RIBBON BABIES AND
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transracial adoption, when adoption professionals gave “the same parenting
instructions given to same-race adoptive families—‘raise your adopted child “as
if” they were your biological child.’”129
The data are not fully in on whether the more recent attempts to address
racial and cultural identity in transracial adoption have made a difference for
transracial adoptees;130 the voices of these adoptees as they reach adulthood are
beginning to emerge and will prove helpful in answering that question.131
With the exponential growth in transracial adoption and the end of
matching, modern adoption does not mimic biological expectations. Today no
one would take the position that Louisiana took in 1970, that it was “unnatural”
for white parents to produce a Black child via biology, and therefore it was
equally unnatural for them to adopt.132
B.

Same-Sex Parenting Made Visible

Biology prevents single persons or same-sex couples, unaided, from
producing offspring. Yet, there is an increasing number of such families.133 As
one book puts it, “The gay and lesbian community is experiencing a baby
boom.”134 Approximately a third of lesbian couples report they are parenting
children, while a little more than a fifth of gay couples reported parenting at
least one child.135 While many are raising biological children from a prior
LABORS OF LOVE: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN U.S. ADOPTION PRACTICE 34 (2010);
Pinderhughes et al., supra note 122, at 499–500.
129. Pinderhughes et al., supra note 122, at 494. Some transracial adoptive parents still follow this
advice, taking a color-blind approach that ignores or minimizes the importance of race. Killian et al.,
supra note 122, at 262.
130. Researchers also identify a possible confounding factor—the comfort levels of more recent
transracial adoptees may have less to do with parental efforts to address racial identity and more to do
with the availability of the internet and online communities of color. See Jason D. Reynolds (Taewon
Choi), Nicole T. Elimelech, Simonleigh P. Miller, Megan E. Ingraham, Bridget M. Anton & Chiroshri
Bhattacharjee, In Their Own Voices: Identity and Racial Socialization Experiences of Young Adult Chinese
Adoptees, 25 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 85, 86 (2021).
131. See id. at 86–87; Krystal K. Cashen, Dominique K. Altamari, Harold D. Grotevant & Ruth
G. McRoy, Hearing the Voices of Young Adult Adoptees: Perspectives on Adoption Agency Practice, 97 CHILD
WELFARE, no. 4, 2019, at 1, 2; Julia Chinyere Oparah, Sun Yung Shin & Jane Jeong Trenka,
Introduction to OUTSIDERS WITHIN: WRITING ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (Jane Jeong Trenka,
Julia Chinyere Oparah & Sun Yung Shin eds., 2021).
132. See KENNEDY, supra note 58, at 389.
133. Cynthia Godsoe, Adopting the Gay Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. 311, 315, 329–30 (2015).
134. SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD 1 (2002).
135. Jackie M. Davis & Mary Frances Hanline, Young Children with Same-Sex Parents: Supporting
Families and Children in Early Childhood Programs, 21 YOUNG EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 127, 128 (2018)
(relying on U.S. Census Bureau data). Some report that as many as fourteen million children are being
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heterosexual relationship,136 one source notes that 65,500 adopted children are
being raised by gay parents, amounting to more than four percent of all adopted
children.137 Cynthia Godsoe notes that even while forty-three states explicitly
banned gay marriage before the Supreme Court invalidated such bans, only
seven banned same-sex fostering and adoption.138 But it may be less that states
approved of same-sex adoption than that most gay parents were closeted.139
Single-parent adoption, and in particular single-woman adoption, was not
uncommon prior to World War II,140 and some of those single adoptions were
actually by lesbian women who raised their children together with other
women.141
When gay parenting first became visible, however, it was less accepted. As
gay and lesbian people sought rights in the 1970s, there was a backlash142 that
included pushback against same-sex adoption.143 In 1977, as part of antigay
activism spearheaded by Anita Bryant, the Florida legislature enacted an
explicit ban against gay and lesbian individuals adopting.144 In a 1977 Gallup
raised by same-sex parents, but the accuracy of that figure has been questioned. See Walter R. Schumm,
Martin Seay, Keondria McClish, Keisha Clark, Abdullah Asiri, Nadyah Abdullah & Shuyi Huang,
Assessing the History of Exaggerated Estimates of the Number of Children Being Raised by Same-Sex Parents
As Reported in Both Legal and Social Science Sources, 30 BYU J. PUB. L. 277, 278–79 (2016).
136. See Davis et al., supra note 135, at 128; see also Godsoe, supra note 133, at 322.
137. GARY J. GATES, M.V. LEE BADGETT, JENNIFER EHRLE MACOMBER & KATE CHAMBERS,
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2007),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/46401/411437-Adoption-and-Foster-Care-byLesbian-and-Gay-Parents-in-the-United-States.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y7WF-WU6C].
138. Godsoe, supra note 133, at 335.
139. Id. at 330 (“Historical accounts do not generally discuss LGB adoption before the 1970s for
the simple reason that homosexuality was still criminalized, and few people were ‘out.’”).
140. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 203–04.
141. Id. at 90–91 (discussing the relationship and adoptions of two women, Jessie Taft and her life
partner, Virginia Robinson, who were also child welfare experts in the 1920s; the exact nature of their
relationship is, of course, unknown, but they bought a house together and raised the children together,
and Taft described in a letter, “We feel very much like a family”); see also id. at 90 n.24 (listing almost
a dozen women of that era, mostly child welfare and health advocates, who adopted as single women
and raised children with female partners).
142. Gillian Frank, “The Civil Rights of Parents”: Race and Conservative Politics in Anita Bryant’s
Campaign Against Gay Rights in 1970s Florida, 22 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 126, 127 (2013).
143. Carlos A. Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, 38
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379, 383 (2007).
144. Id. at 383; HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 292; BRIGGS, supra note 94, at
245–46. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Florida ban in 2004 in a case
involving gay foster parents of HIV-positive children who wished to adopt them. See generally Lofton
v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Child. and Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding the ban on due
process grounds). For more about the Lofton-Croteau family that fought the Florida law, see WE ARE
DAD (Tavroh Films 2005). But in 2010, a Florida state court found that the ban on gay adoption
violated the Florida Constitution. See generally Fla. Dep’t of Child. and Fams. v. In re Adoption of
X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the ban violated the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution).
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poll, only fourteen percent of Americans believed that gays and lesbians should
be allowed to adopt children.145 In the 1980s and 90s, “Christian conservatives
supported definitions of kinship and familial divisions of labor that were, in
their view, ‘traditional’: families centered on heterosexual marriages with stayat-home mothers and breadwinning fathers.”146 Thus, though they vocally
supported adoption as an antidote to abortion,147 they opposed adoption by gay
men and lesbians.148 Arguments about the “traditional” family were deeply
entwined with biology; as one legislator opposing gay adoption said, “A normal
biological unit of a family is a mother and father.”149 Never mind that at issue
was adoptive families, not biological families—again, adoption must mimic
biology in this conservative formulation.
Nonetheless, “gay family law attorneys continued to win victories,
expanding options for LGBT people to adopt or foster, first as veiled ‘single
parents’ who hid their lovers and later as gay couples.”150 According to a Gallup
poll, by 2003 the number of Americans who believed gay men and lesbians
should be permitted to adopt had increased from the 1977 figure of fourteen
percent to forty-nine percent.151 A year before the Supreme Court legalized gay
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges152 in 2015, the Gallup poll showed sixty-three
percent believed that same-sex couples should have the legal right to adopt a
child.153 In Obergefell, the children of gay and lesbian couples were the
centerpiece of the argument for the validity of gay marriage.154 Justice Kennedy
highlighted the story of one such couple:
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case from
Michigan. They celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor their
permanent relation in 2007. They both work as nurses, DeBoer in a
neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In 2009, DeBoer and
Rowse fostered and then adopted a baby boy. Later that same year, they
welcomed another son into their family. The new baby, born
145. LGBT
Rights,
GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NAM5-GRBX] (cataloging data associated with June 17–20, 1977).
146. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 292.
147. Samuel L. Perry, Conservative Christians and Support for Transracial Adoption as an Alternative
to Abortion, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 380, 381 (2014); BRIGGS, supra note 94, at 28.
148. HERMAN, KINSHIP BY DESIGN, supra note 49, at 292.
149. Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2003).
150. BRIGGS, supra note 94, at 258.
151. GALLUP, supra note 145 (cataloging data associated with May 5–7, 2003).
152. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
153. GALLUP, supra note 145 (cataloging data associated with May 8–11, 2014). By 2019, the figure
had risen again to seventy-five percent. Id.
154. NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 18, at 2065.
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prematurely and abandoned by his biological mother, required aroundthe-clock care. The next year, a baby girl with special needs joined their
family. Michigan, however, permits only opposite-sex married couples
or single individuals to adopt, so each child can have only one woman as
his or her legal parent. If an emergency were to arise, schools and
hospitals may treat the three children as if they had only one parent.
And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would
have no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to
adopt. This couple seeks relief from the continuing uncertainty their
unmarried status creates in their lives.155
The Court further noted changing attitudes toward gay and lesbian
couples, again focusing on family: “In the late 20th century, following
substantial cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead
more open and public lives and to establish families.”156
One of its four justifications for protecting the right to marry in Obergefell
was that “it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”157 The Court noted
that marriage was important to children in allowing them to see their families
as similar to others in their community,158 and to benefit from the permanency
and stability that marriage affords and that is so profoundly in children’s best
interest.159 Furthermore, the Court observed that many children were already
being raised by gay couples in loving and nurturing homes, and at least in
adoptive and foster homes, being raised with the full approval of states that
permit gay adoption and foster placements.160
But in case there was any doubt that the Court was relying on biological
notions of family in approving gay marriage, Justice Kennedy also decoupled
the ruling from procreation, recognizing that procreation “is not and has not
been a prerequisite for a valid marriage.”161 Gay families were fully families,
deserving of the same recognition that marriage provides, as straight families.
Children of gay and lesbian couples needed marriage so that they would not
“suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”162

155. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 658–59.
156. Id. at 661.
157. Id. at 667.
158. Id. at 668 (describing how giving recognition and legal structure to adopted children’s parents’
relationship, children understand the integrity and closeness of their own family).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 669.
162. Id. at 668.
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The Supreme Court further decoupled family from biology for gay
couples in Pavan v. Smith,163 by extending the marital presumption of parentage
to a lesbian couple. The marital presumption, of ancient origins, made a child
conceived or born during marriage legally the child of the mother’s husband.164
The State of Arkansas, post-Obergefell, refused to issue birth certificates to two
married same-sex couples who conceived via donor insemination.165 If they had
been an opposite-sex couple who conceived by means of assisted reproduction
both parents would have been listed on the birth certificate despite the absence
of biological parenthood.166 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of
Obergefell, that the Constitution entitled same-sex couples not just the right to
marry, but also that the marriage be “on the same terms and conditions as
opposite-sex couples.”167 Arkansas could not deny the birth certificate based on
the marital presumption, as it was one of the “constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage.”168
Despite the public acceptance of gay and lesbian parenting, there is still
resistance couched in terms of religious freedom. In Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia,169 the Supreme Court held that it violated the free exercise rights
of a religious-based agency to insist that it comply with the City’s
nondiscrimination ordinance that prevented discrimination against gay and
lesbian people.170 The Catholic agency insisted that it would burden their
religious exercise to place foster children with gay and lesbian couples. Despite
holding that the agency was entitled to discriminate in this case, the Court also

163. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam).
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (tracing the history of the presumption
that children were legally the child of the mother’s husband, and citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE
BASTARDY 1 (1836), which in turn cites BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE
(1569)).
165. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2–3, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172, rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per
curiam). Arkansas argued that the purpose of birth certificates is simply to record a biological fact—
the “truthfully recorded” “nexus of the biological mother and the biological father.” Id. at 13–14, 505
S.W.3d at 179. That was a patently false statement, since birth certificates in Arkansas can reflect the
nonbiological father of a child conceived through donor insemination and the nonbiological parents of
an adopted child. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
166. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077. The Arkansas statute provided: “Any child born to a married woman
by means of artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the
woman’s husband if the husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination.” ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-201(a) (LEXIS through all acts of the 2021 Reg. Sess., First Extraordinary Sess., Extended
Sess., Second Extraordinary Sess., and the 2022 Fiscal Session including corrections and edits by the
Ark. Code Revision Comm’n).
167. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 2077 (citation omitted).
169. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
170. See id. at 1875.
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noted that the City’s interest in preventing discrimination was considerable:
“for ‘[o]ur society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples
cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.’”171
The Court’s full acceptance in Obergefell and Pavan of families that do not
mimic biology is one more example of how gay adoption and parenting has
“expanded the boundaries of acceptable families.”172 As biology becomes less
central in definitions of family, the argument that adoption should mimic the
traditional nuclear, biological family becomes less compelling.
C.

Assisted Reproduction Decoupling Family & Biology

Noted family law scholar Janet Dolgin has observed that “[t]he advent and
swift expansion of reproductive technology beginning in the late 1970s
accelerated the transformation of the family by undermining sacred
assumptions about the reproductive process.”173 By decoupling family from
biology, assisted reproductive technology opens up possibilities of family forms
that do not mimic nature.174 “Increasingly, an individual or a couple raising a
newborn child may not be biologically related to the child.”175
Assisted reproductive technology is the paradigmatic example of multiple
biological progenitors, with the law seeking to restrict legal parenthood to a
maximum of two parents. One person might supply an egg to be fertilized in
vitro with another person’s sperm,176 and the embryo might be placed in a third
person’s uterus for gestation,177 all with the intent that the child will be actually
parented by a fourth and possibly fifth person.178 Even as medical science might
recognize that the child created in such an arrangement has multiple biological
171. Id. at 1882 (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018)).
172. Godsoe, supra note 133, at 339.
173. Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L. REV.
225, 225 (1998).
174. Courtney G. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 401, 404 (2021) (“Surrogacy law
holds the potential to challenge family law rules that long have excluded families that depart from
gender- and biology-based norms about the nature of motherhood and fatherhood.”); Douglas NeJaime,
The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2264 (2017) (“Those who form families through assisted
reproductive technologies (ART)—donor insemination, in vitro fertilization, and gestational
surrogacy—frequently establish parental relationships in the absence of gestational or genetic
connections to their children.”).
175. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 416; NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 18,
at 1264.
176. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 416.
177. Id.
178. Storrow, supra note 12, at 602. Storrow notes that a child might have as many as eight
individuals who can lay claim to parentage—in addition to multiple biological “parents,” the spouses
of gamete donors and gestational surrogates might also have a claim to legal parenthood.
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progenitors, the law strips away all but two in legally recognizing who is called
“parent.”179 Legal parenthood in assisted reproduction today is determined in
most jurisdictions by social, not biological, factors like who intended to
parent.180 That was not, however, always the case. In the early days of surrogacy,
courts often determined legal parenthood by biology.
In Doe v. Doe,181 for example, a Connecticut couple hired a surrogate who
was impregnated with the husband’s sperm. The wife had no genetic or
gestational role in the child’s conception or birth.182 But the couple pretended
that the wife had given birth to the child, with the surrogate falsely presenting
as the wife at prenatal visits and at the hospital at birth.183 The wife went so far
as to stuff pillows under her shirt to simulate pregnancy. The names of the
parents on the certified birth certificate were the names of the husband and
wife.184 They raised the child together for eight years before separating, and
then shared custody during seven years of a contested divorce and custody
proceeding.185 Yet the Connecticut court held that the wife was not a legal
parent.186 Thus, the custody dispute was not between a mother and father, but
between a parent and a nonparent.187
The lack of a genetic or gestational link to the child also led a California
court to rule that a surrogate, not the intending mother, was the legal mother
of a child.188 Robert and Cynthia arranged to have a child via a surrogate,189 but
they filed for divorce soon after the birth.190 Cynthia sought custody of the
child, and the surrogate intervened also seeking custody.191 The trial court
179. Samuels, An Immodest Proposal, supra note 7, at 416.
180. NeJaime, Marriage Equality, supra note 18, at 1264.
181. 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
182. Id. at 1302.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1297.
187. Id. at 1322–23. That legal posture advantaged the father with a presumption that it is in the
best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent. As a legal stranger to the child, the
nonmother had the obligation to rebut the presumption by showing that “it would be detrimental to
the child to permit the parent to have custody.” Id. at 1301 n.5 (citation omitted). The court ultimately
concluded that the stranger mother had met this burden and awarded her custody, id. at 1323, but if
she were a legal parent, she would not have had the burden of rebutting the presumption in the first
place.
188. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
189. Id. at 895.
190. Id. In fact, the surrogate found out while she was in labor that the Moschettas were having
marital difficulties and began to rethink the surrogacy arrangement. Id. She only allowed them to take
the baby home after they promised they would stay together. See id. They began divorce proceedings
when the baby was seven months old. See id.
191. Id.
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declared that the child’s legal parents were the biological father, Robert, and the
surrogate mother.192 Cynthia was not a mother at all.193 The appellate court
concluded that when parentage is judged in traditional surrogacy, “biology is
destiny.”194
As Professor Courtney Joslin notes, “In the past, the person who gave birth
was always considered a legal parent. Hence, children always had mothers at
birth. But under permissive surrogacy laws, the person who gave birth may not
be the child’s legal parent at birth.”195 Gestational surrogacy presented a
problem with the biology-is-destiny theory of parenthood because two women
can make a claim based in biology as one woman supplies the egg and another
woman gestates and births the baby.196 But because the law will only recognize
one legal mother for the child, “identifying the legal mother in gestational
surrogacy cases sometimes gives rise to legal disputes.”197
Today, surrogacy legal disputes are generally resolved by statute; twentyseven jurisdictions (twenty-six states and the District of Columbia) have
surrogacy statutes.198 Twenty-two of the twenty-seven regimes that have
addressed surrogacy by statute permit at least some surrogacy arrangements and
will enforce surrogacy contracts.199 Who is deemed a parent to the child and
who is deemed a legal stranger to the child depends on the specifics of the
statutory scheme,200 but the general trend is to recognize the intended parents
as legal parents and the surrogate as a legal stranger.
To illustrate how the newer statutory law has (or has not) changed the
“biology is destiny” cases of In re Marriage of Moschetta201 and Doe v. Doe,

192. Id.
193. Id. at 903. The court rejected the premise that Cynthia and the surrogate were “equally” the
mother of the child—Cynthia because she intended to be the mother and the surrogate because she was
genetically and gestationally the mother—and that intentionality should break the tie between them.
Id. at 896. The court bluntly asserted: “The flaw in the argument is that Cynthia is not ‘equally’ the
mother of Marissa. In fact, she is not Marissa’s mother at all. There is no ‘tie’ to break.” Id.
194. Id. at 903.
195. Joslin, supra note 174, at 406; see also Courtney Megan Cahill, The New Maternity, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 2221, 2224 (2020) (questioning the legal assumption that maternity is “certain, obvious,
monolithic, and rarely in doubt”).
196. Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 611 (2003).
197. Storrow, supra note 12, at 604.
198. Joslin, supra note 174, at 409, 464–73 (including an appendix listing and describing surrogacy
law in all fifty states).
199. Id. at 409.
200. Id.
201. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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consider the outcome of those cases if decided under statutes passed in
California and Connecticut since those cases were decided.
In California, statutes define both traditional surrogates202 and gestational
carriers,203 but that definition is the only appearance of “traditional surrogates”
in the California Family Code.204 Further, in 2013, California adopted a
gestational surrogacy statute that legalized gestational surrogacy agreements.205
But recall that Moschetta was a traditional surrogacy case.206 California statutes
are silent on the status of traditional surrogacy agreements.207 Does that mean,
even today, that the Moschetta court would conclude that the intending mother
was no mother at all? One Californian practitioner guide suggests that is a
possibility:
No guidance is provided for what would make a traditional surrogacy
valid and enforceable. Presumably traditional surrogacy qualifies as
“assisted reproduction” as defined in Family Code § 7606(a), since it is
a form of non-sexual reproduction; and, if there is a written agreement
between the parties which spells out who the intended parents are, the
agreement also should qualify as an “assisted reproduction agreement” as
defined in § 7606(b). However, beyond that the courts are left to figure
out for themselves whether traditional surrogacy actually exists as a legal
construct and, if so, what it consists of.208
Still, many commentators take the position that traditional surrogacy is
legal in California because the statutes’ silence means it is not prohibited, and a
1998 case recognized a surrogacy arrangement where neither intending parent
had a genetic connection to a child born of a gestational surrogate but were
nonetheless recognized as legal parents.209 Under these arguments, the outcome
in Moschetta might well be different today, but that result is less than certain.
In Connecticut, the state involved in Doe v. Doe, there has also been some
change in the legal landscape of surrogacy. Connecticut recognizes surrogacy

202. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7960(f)(1) (Westlaw through Ch. 134 of 2022 Reg. Sess.) (“[A] woman
who agrees to gestate an embryo, in which the woman is the gamete donor and the embryo was created
using the sperm of the intended father or a donor arranged by the intended parent or parents.”).
203. Id. § 7960(f)(2) (Westlaw) (“[A] woman who is not an intended parent and who agrees to
gestate a genetically unrelated embryo pursuant to an assisted reproduction agreement.”).
204. 2 KATHRYN KIRKLAND, IRA H. LURVEY, DIANA RICHMOND & STEPHEN JAMES WAGNER,
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 36.09[3] (2d ed. 2021).
205. Act of Sept. 23, 2012, ch. 466, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. Cal. Stat. 4390 (codified as amended at
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (2013)).
206. In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903.
207. Joslin, supra note 174, at 413.
208. 2 KIRKLAND ET AL., supra note 204, § 36.09[3].
209. See In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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agreements by allowing a replacement birth certificate listing the intending
parents as the legal parents once a court has issued an order of parentage under
the agreement.210 Until 2021, however, that was limited to gestational surrogacy,
with the statute silent as to traditional surrogacy. Effective January 1, 2022,
Connecticut recognized traditional surrogacy as well as gestational surrogacy.211
Under this new statutory scheme, the result in Doe v. Doe would be different.
The traditional surrogacy agreement in that case would now be respected, and
the intending parents would be legal parents.
Even with new statutory reforms, there can be uncertainty about who the
legal parents are in surrogacy arrangements, as the California statutory scheme
illustrates. At least one driver of litigation over parentage in the surrogacy
situation is the limitation on the number of persons who can be a legal parent,
which cannot be more than two. The ways in which assisted reproductive
technology, including surrogacy, has decoupled parentage from biology suggest
that the last biological vestige—no more than two parents—is no longer helpful
or necessary. Yet the requirement persists, leading to disputes between
biological and intending parents. If more than two parents could be recognized
these disputes would not exist.
The growth of assisted reproductive technology, including surrogacy,
highlights the growing trend of families that do not mimic biology. Biology is
no longer destiny. Yet the biological family persists as the model for all
nonbiological families. As a result, despite the death of the erase-and-replace
imperative in adoption, the adoption equation remains one of subtraction rather
than addition.
III. ADOPTION AS ADDITION, NOT SUBTRACTION
Is it possible to conceive of a family with more than two legal parents?
That has long been possible in France as well as other areas of the world where
adoption does not legally erase the biological family. Would such families be
good for children? The psychological literature strongly suggests that adopted
children need to maintain connections to their biological families even as they

210. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-48a(b) (2021); see also Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 788 (Conn.
2011) (recognizing two males as the legal parents of a child born to gestational surrogate, when one was
the biological father and one an intending parent).
211. Connecticut Parentage Act, Pub. Act No. 21-15, § 60 (codified in scattered sections of CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b) (defining genetic surrogate (traditional surrogate) and gestational surrogate); § 68
(recognizing that upon birth of a child under a gestational surrogacy agreement the intending parent(s)
are, by operation of law, legal parent(s)); § 2(13) (recognizing that upon birth of a child under a genetic
surrogacy agreement the intending parent(s) are, by operation of law, legal parent(s)).
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join a new adoptive family. The next section will address the psychological
literature relating to connectedness in adoption, discuss some adoption practices
around the world that support connection, and then analyze the French practice
of adoption as addition rather than subtraction. This section will also consider
what lessons unsuccessful attempts to create adoption as addition in Quebec can
impart, and the passage of California’s statute permitting more than two
parents.
A.

Connection in Adoption

Adoption as currently practiced in the United States is not always a benign
institution for adoptees. While adoption often has a positive effect on
adoptees,212 psychological studies show that many adoptees experience issues
throughout their lifetimes.213 Many adoptees struggle with adoption identity
issues, which may explain high levels of behavioral issues reported in adopted
children and adolescents,214 as well as the fact that they are significantly

212. David M. Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes in Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILD. 153, 153 (1993)
[hereinafter Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes] (describing how outcomes for adopted children are
better than those for children raised in foster or institutional care); EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION
INST., BEYOND CULTURE CAMP: PROMOTING HEALTHY IDENTITY FORMATION IN ADOPTION 9
(2009) [hereinafter EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., BEYOND CULTURE CAMP] (noting the
“extensive research indicating that children adopted across racial/ethnic lines generally fare as well as
their non-adopted counterparts”).
213. Harold D. Grotevant, Albert Y.H. Lo, Lisa Fiorenzo & Nora D. Dunbar, Adoptive Identity
and Adjustment from Adolescence to Emerging Adulthood: A Person-Centered Approach, 53
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 2195, 2199 (2017) (examining fifteen- to twenty-five-year-olds who were
adopted as infants, finding that adjustment difficulties associated with identity development persist
over time); EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., BEYOND CULTURE CAMP, supra note 212, at
29–30. This study found, against expectations, that adoption issues would taper off for adults, that for
both same-race and transracial adoptees adoptee identity continued into adulthood. “[Result] suggests
the lifelong nature of identity work and the reality that adulthood is a crucial period in which adoptive
and racial/ethnic identities continue to be salient for adopted persons.” Id. at 30. Almost one-fourth of
same-race adoptees reported, as adults, that they felt extremely or somewhat uncomfortable with their
identity as an adopted person. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 145 n.322; see EVAN B.
DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., BEYOND CULTURE CAMP, supra note 212, at 32.
214. Grotevant et al., supra note 213, at 2196 (“The extensive literature on psychological outcomes
for adopted persons indicates an elevated risk for adjustment problems, ranging from mild to serious
psychopathology.”); Daniel W. Smith & David Brodzinsky, Stress and Coping in Adopted Children: A
Developmental Study, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCH. 91, 91 (1994); Femmie Juffer, Children’s Awareness
of Adoption and Their Problem Behavior in Families with 7-Year-Old Internationally Adopted Children, 9
ADOPTION Q. 1, 2 (2006).
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overrepresented in mental health care facilities.215 Studies have also shown an
increased risk of suicide and suicide attempts by adoptees.216
Adoptees may experience adoption not as the exclusively happy event
adoptive parents and society ascribe to it, but as a more nuanced experience.217
Adoptees may experience adoption as a profound loss—loss of family, loss of
culture, loss of language, loss of all sense of familiarity—despite the
“replacement” of the lost birth family by the adoptive family.218 Adoptees may
fear abandonment and rejection, and experience issues with trust and
attachment that affects future relationships.219 Because of cultural biases that

215. David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF ADOPTION 3, 3 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schecter eds., 1990) (reporting that although
adopted children are only two percent of the population, they represent between four and five percent
referred to outpatient mental health facilities and ten to fifteen percent in residential care facilities);
Michael Wierzbicki, Psychological Adjustment of Adoptees: A Meta-Analysis, 22 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCH. 447, 451 (1993) (adoptees significantly overrepresented in clinical populations); Femmie Juffer
& Marinus H. van IJzendoorn, Behavior Problems and Mental Health Referrals of International Adoptees:
A Meta-Analysis, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2501, 2507 (2005) (noting that adoptees, both domestic and
international, exhibited more behavior problems than nonadoptee controls, and were overrepresented
in mental health referrals). It is possible that the overrepresentation of adoptees in clinical populations
is not because of increased incidences of psychological problems, but because of increased rates of
referrals by adoptive parents and professionals who are aware of issues relating to adoption and,
therefore, might be more inclined to refer. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 145 n.324;
see Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes, supra note 212, at 3.
216. Gail Slap, Elizabeth Goodman & Bin Huang, Adoption as a Risk Factor for Attempted Suicide
During Adolescence, 108 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2001) (reporting an increased risk of suicide among American
adoptees living with an adoptive parent when compared to those living with a biological parent);
Annika von Borczyskowski, Anders Hjern, Frank Lindblad & Bo Vinnerljung, Suicidal Behaviour in
National and International Adult Adoptees: A Swedish Cohort Study, 41 SOC. PSYCHIATRY &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 95 (2006) (reporting increased suicidality for domestic adoptees
compared to the population at large, and an even higher risk for international adoptees). But see William
Feigelman, Are Adoptees at Increased Risk for Attempting Suicide?, 35 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING
BEHAV. 206, 213 (2005) (reporting no greater risk of attempting suicide and depression for adoptees).
217. See Brodzinsky, Long-Term Outcomes, supra note 212, at 155 (explaining that adopted children
have higher rates of “acting out”); Penny Callan Partridge, The Particular Challenges of Being Adopted,
61 SMITH COLL. STUD. SOC. WORK, 197, 198 (1991) (positing that all adoptees face issues of loss, less
grounding in reality, secrecy around adoption, doubts about self-worth, lack of genetic mirrors, divided
loyalties and identities, and feelings of being an outsider).
218. Partridge, supra note 217, at 199.
219. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 145; see Wendy Tieman, Jan van der Ende &
Frank C. Verhulst, Social Functioning of Young Adult Intercountry Adoptees Compared to Nonadoptees, 41
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 68, 70 (2006) (explaining that adult adoptees in
the study were almost two times less likely to be married than nonadopted counterparts, were less likely
to be living with a romantic partner, and were less likely to have had a relationship that lasted longer
than one year). But see Johanna Despax, Evelyne Bouteyre & Jean-Baptiste Pavani, Adoptees’ Romantic
Relationships: Comparison with Nonadoptees, Psychological Predictors and Long-Term Implications of the
Adoption Pathway, 24 ADOPTION Q. 251, 265 (2021) (finding no differences between adoptees and
nonadoptees not accounted for by pre-adoption experiences).
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favor biological families, adoptees may face stigma associated with being
adopted.220
Adoption professionals recognize that “adopted children are part of two
separate and distinct family groups—one preexisting the adoption and the other
created as a result of the adoption.”221 Although the law traditionally severs the
relationship with one while creating the other, modern understanding is that
adopted children exist in a web of relationships between the two.222 One study
of First Nation adoptees in Canada showed significant links between
connectedness to birth family and tribe, mental and physical health, and wellbeing.223 Adoptee author Nicole Chung makes this point about continuing
connections even after adoption: “My thinking about family bonds expanded as
a result of searching for and finding my birth family. I realized these are real
bonds and links that we have—and even if they were broken, they’re still there,
220. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 145. Consider this description of the stigma of
being adopted:
Adopted children are seen as coming from a defective biological line; their birth parents
either did not want them or were immoral and dysfunctional. Adopted children are seen as
damaged goods, presumed to have suffered maltreatment after birth before being rescued
and processed by the child protective system, and therefore, likely to have lifelong
struggles. . . . Adopted children also appear atomistic, because they are disconnected from
their extended biological family and because we suspect their extended adoptive family keeps
them at arms length, never treating them as full or equal members of the family. They are
persons with no real family. Because of this perception, adopted children are often
uncomfortable revealing that they were adopted. This perception is a major reason why many
adoptees undertake a search for their birth parents: we communicate to them that they are
deficient, lacking something of great importance, and as a result, they go to great lengths to
try to become complete.
James G. Dwyer, First Parents: Reconceptualizing Newborn Adoption, 37 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 293, 295–
96 (2008); see Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 145 n.328; see also Amanda Baden, “Do
You Know Your Real Parents?” and Other Adoption Microaggressions, 19 ADOPTION Q. 1, 13 (2016)
(examining adoption stigma and microaggressions and identifying thirteen themes common to
adoption stigma).
221. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered
Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (1995); see also Anne J. Atkinson & Debbie B.
Riley, Training for Adoption Competency: Building a Community of Adoption-Competent Clinicians, 98
FAMS. SOC’Y 235, 239 (2017) (noting the importance of adoption-competent therapists realizing the
“importance and ongoing impact of birth parents”); Anne J. Atkinson, Adoption Competent Clinical
Practice, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ADOPTION 435, 438 (Gretchen Miller Wrobel, Emily
Helder & Elisha Marr eds., 2020) (stating that adoption competent therapists acknowledge that a
“child’s past and current relationships with birth parents and other birth family members, including
siblings, play a critical role in the child’s development and adjustment”).
222. Malinda L. Seymore, Ethical Lawyering in Adoption: Centering the Child in Adoption Law, 24
ADOPTION Q. 48, 60 (2021) [hereinafter Seymore, Ethical Lawyering].
223. Jeannine Carriere, Connectedness and Health for First Nation Adoptees, 10 PAEDIATR CHILD
HEALTH 545, 545, 548 (2005) (study of eighteen adult First Nations adoptees, examining feelings of
connectedness with birth family and tribe as contributing factor to mental and physical health issues).
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in this fundamental way. It was strange to me to deny that.”224 Annette Appell
describes the absent birth family as “a ghost family, not physically present but
lurking.”225
While secrecy and matching in adoption was once the prevailing practice,
the modern trend is toward openness, with at least some continuing relationship
between birth family and adopted child.226 Studies of all members of the
adoption triad show that openness best serves all.227 Thus, open adoption may
offer lessons for the value of multiple parents that allow continuing contact.
Numerous social science studies show that openness and continuing
contact in adoption is good for adoptees. It improves the relationship between
adoptees and their adoptive parents, increases adoptees’ self-esteem and
confidence, and helps in identity formation for all adoptees and racial identity
formation in transracial adoptees.228 Adopted children in open adoptions
understood that adoption was permanent, and felt secure in their relationships
with their adoptive parents,229 in contrast to criticism that children who
maintained contact with birth parents would be confused about who the “real”
parents were. When children were excluded from contact with birth parents,
224. Ashley Fetters, The Fraught Language of Adoption: A Conversation with the Writer Nicole Chung,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/10/adoptees-real-parentsnicole-chung/571783/ [https://perma.cc/FEU2-GLAM (dark archive)]. See generally NICOLE CHUNG,
ALL YOU CAN EVER KNOW: A MEMOIR (2018) (detailing Chung’s experiences through her memoir).
225. Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER
& SOC’Y 73, 131 (2010); see also Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 225 (“[B]irth
parents—in their absence—would have a powerful presence in . . . [my adoptive] family.”).
226. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 163.
227. Seymore, Ethical Lawyering, supra note 222, at 60. Adoption myths that lead to closed
adoptions are not supported by more recent trends in adoption research, which have “challenged the
assumed benefits of closed adoptions and suggested that openness is not only a viable option but often
a preferable adoption arrangement.” Donna Brown, Scott Ryan & Janet Therese Pushkal, Initial
Validation of the Open Adoption Scale: Measuring the Influence of Adoption Myths on Attitudes Toward Open
Adoption, 10 ADOPTION Q. 179, 181 (2007).
228. David Brodzinsky, Family Structural Openness and Communication Openness As Predictors in the
Adjustment of Adopted Children, 9 ADOPTION Q. 1, 10 (2006) (study of same-race, infant placement
adoptions shows correlation between more openness in adoption and higher self-esteem in adoptees);
Margaret Sykes, Adoption with Contact: A Study of Adoptive Parents and the Impact of Continuing Contact
with Families of Origin, 24 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 20, 26 (2000) (in UK-based study, adoptive parent
satisfaction with open adoption increased over time); Haley Kranstuber Horstman, Colleen Warner
Colaner & Christine E. Rittenour, Contributing Factors of Adult Adoptees’ Identity Work and Self-Esteem:
Family Communication Patterns and Adoption-Specific Communication, 16 J. FAM. COMMC’N 263, 272–73
(2016) (finding in study of adult adoptees that communicative openness (willingness to talk openly and
honestly about adoption) promotes healthful consideration of adoptive identity and correlates
positively to higher self-esteem).
229. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 179; see HAROLD D. GROTEVANT & RUTH
G. MCROY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: EXPLORING FAMILY CONNECTIONS 91–92 (1998) (noting no
significant difference between children in open adoptions and closed adoptions in terms of belief in
security and permanence of adoption).
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when such contact is possible, approximately two-thirds expressed concerns
about permanence.230 Thus, the quality of the relationship adopted children
have with their adoptive parents is enhanced by openness.231
Adoptive parents feel more certain about the permanency of the adoption
as they are less fearful about the birth parents.232 Birth mothers experience less
grief when they know that their children are happy in their adoptive homes.233
Birth fathers feel more positively about the adoption when they are involved in
the process.234 In all, an adoption process that encourages continuing
relationships is better for all involved—and especially so for adopted children.235
Secrecy in adoption, like most family secrets, can be dangerous and
damaging. Consider the experience of late-discovery adoptees—those who were

230. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 179. See GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note
227, at 91–92.
231. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 179, 179 n.98; see also Sykes, supra note 228,
at 20, 25 (contact with birth family is helpful in reducing a child’s sense of “muddle and confusion,”
enabling growth of more satisfying relationship with adopters).
232. Seymore, Ethical Lawyering, supra note 222, at 60; see, e.g., Harold D. Grotevant, Openness in
Adoption: Research with the American Kinship Network, 4 ADOPTION Q. 45, 50 (2000) (showing that
adoptive parents in open adoptions experienced lower level of fear that the birth mother would seek to
reclaim child); GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 229, at 91 (stating that familiarity with birth
parents reduces fear that they will reclaim child); Deborah H. Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive
Parents’ Feelings Seven Years Later, 48 SOC. WORK 409, 417 (2003) (finding that in follow-up study
seven years after open adoption placement, parents still express satisfaction with open adoption);
Xiaojia Ge, Misaki N. Natsuaki, David M. Martin, Leslie D. Leve, Jenae M. Neiderhiser, Daniel S.
Shaw, Georgette Villareal, Laura Scaramella, John B. Reid & David Reiss, Bridging the Divide: Openness
in Adoption and Postadoption Psychosocial Adjustment Among Birth and Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. PSYCH.
529, 529 (2008) (studying 323 matched adoptive parents and birth mothers and finding that adoptive
parents’ satisfaction with the adoption positively correlated to degree of openness); Marianne Berry,
Adoptive Parents’ Perceptions of, and Comfort with, Open Adoption, 72 CHILD WELFARE 231, 234, 246
(1993) (stating that increased openness correlated to increased satisfaction for adoptive parents).
233. Ge et al., supra note 232, at 529 (finding openness positively correlated with post-adoption
adjustment and satisfaction with the adoption); Ruth G. McRoy, Harold D. Grotevant, Susan AyersLopez & Susan M. Henney, Open Adoptions: Longitudinal Outcomes for the Adoption Triad, in
HANDBOOK OF ADOPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS, PRACTITIONERS, AND FAMILIES
175 (Rafael A. Javier, Amanda L. Baden, Frank A. Biafora & Alina Camacho-Gingerich eds., 2007)
(showing that birth mothers in longitudinal study at points twelve to twenty years from placement
satisfied with postadoption contact); Cinda L. Christian, Ruth G. McRoy, Harold D. Grotevant &
Chalandra M. Bryant, Grief Resolution of Birthmothers in Confidential, Time-Limited Mediated, Ongoing
Mediated, and Fully Disclosed Adoptions, 1 ADOPTION Q. 35, 48–49 (1997) (finding thirty percent of
birth mothers in closed adoption had very poor grief resolution, while only eleven percent in fully open
adoptions experienced very poor grief resolution).
234. Eva Y. Deykin, Patricia Patti & Jon Ryan, Fathers of Adopted Children: A Study of the Impact of
Child Surrender on Birthfathers, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 240, 243 (1988); Ge et al., supra note
232, at 529 (“[T]he levels of choice or control birth fathers had in determining the degree of openness
was positively associated with birth fathers’ satisfaction toward the adoption experience . . . .”).
235. Malinda L. Seymore, Ethical Lawyering, supra note 222, at 60; see also supra note 227.
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not told that they were adopted until later in life.236 They report, upon
discovery, feelings of betrayal, loss of trust, and difficulty forgiving.237 As one
late-discovery adoptee reported, “I felt profoundly betrayed, . . . the brunt of a
40-year joke.”238 The older a person was in discovering their adoption, the
greater the psychological distress they experienced and the lower quality of life
they reported.239 The secrecy associated with late discovery of adoption can
“create intrapersonal conflicts (such as questioning one’s identities), as well as
interpersonal conflicts with others due to mistrust and other negative
emotions.”240 Late-discovery adoptees also reported that the most successful
coping strategy upon learning of the adoption was to seek connection with the
birth family and other adoptees.241
The psychosocial literature about open adoption suggests that continuing
contact between adoptees and relinquishing birth parents would be as beneficial
as a system where the birth parents retain legal status as parents.
B.

France and Adoption Simple

The way adoption is practiced in America would appear quite strange in
many parts of the world—as strange as their practices may appear to us.242 In
some Polynesian cultures, for example, children are seen as belonging to the
larger society rather than to individual parents, so children are not placed for
adoption through any legal process, but may still be moved around from family
to family for a variety of purposes.243 As Isabelle Leblic notes in her study of
traditional adoption in French Polynesia and New Caledonia,
236. Amanda L. Baden, Doug Shadel, Ron Morgan, Ebony E. White, Elliotte S. Harrington,
Nicole Christian & Todd A. Bates, Delaying Adoption Disclosure: A Survey of Late Discovery Adoptees, 40
J. FAM. ISSUES 1154, 1155 (2019) (noting that the phenomenon lacked agreed-on terminology until
adoptees who experienced it self-labeled as “late discovery adoptees”).
237. Helen J. Riley, The Late Discovery of Adoptive Status, 7 FAM. RELATIONSHIPS Q. 13, 14
(2008).
238. Id.
239. Baden et al., supra note 236, at 1166, 1172 (noting that in study involving 254 adult adoptees,
“distress increases as the age of adoption discovery increases. With respect to life satisfaction, . . .
satisfaction decreased as age of adoption discovery increased”).
240. Id. at 1171.
241. Id.
242. Malinda L. Seymore, Separation and Connectedness: Global Norms of Open vs. Closed Adoption,
in EXPLORING NORMS AND FAMILY LAWS ACROSS THE GLOBE 107 (Melissa Breger ed., 2022).
243. Jessica A.K. Matthews, Ellen E. Pinderhughes & Martha L. Pott, Adoptive Parenting Is More
Complex Than Evolutionary Theory Would Predict: Evidence from Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND PARENTING 375 (Viviana A.
Weekes-Shackelford & Todd Kennedy Shackelford eds., 2021) (citing M. Bourgeois & J. Malarrive,
Fa’a’mu and Fanau: Various Traditional Aspects and Current Problems of Adoption and Donation of Children
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One of the most important features of traditional adoption in Polynesia,
as more generally in Oceania, is that birth parents and adoptive parents
choose each other and, in the majority of cases, stay in touch (there is no
secret about adoption). As a consequence, the children add together the
rights and obligations of their two kin groups (birth and adoption).244
In traditional Maori culture, children were freely shared among families
while children retained family and tribal ties with their original family.245 In
one island of Papua New Guinea as many as half of the inhabitants of some
villages are adopted while maintaining connections with birth families.246 In the
Baatombu tribe in Benin, Africa, children maintain lineal relationships with the
biological father’s tribe, who retains a claim on the child, even as others are
raising the child.247 In Islam, adoption as we know it does not exist. That
“someone other than the biological parents can fictitiously become a parent in
the same position as a biological parent” is forbidden.248 However, kafala is
practiced, a fostering relationship which brings with it
the responsibility of upbringing the adopted child as your own. It tries
to achieve a balance between raising the child as your own all the while
ensuring the adopted child’s identity is not absorbed into the identity of
the adoptive family. Negation of the biological identi[t]y [sic] would be
considered haram or forbidden.249
Psychological literature in the United States and Europe seems to support
these alternative practices regarding the importance of maintaining connections
in French Polynesia, 1 ANN. MED. PSYCHOL (Paris) 721 (1976)); Isabelle Leblic, From French Polynesia
to France: The Legacy of Fa’a’amu Traditional Adoption in “International” Adoption, 56 ANTHROPOLOGICA
449, 449 (2014).
244. Leblic, supra note 243, at 450.
245. See George Graham, Whangai Tamariki: The Custom Pertaining to the Adoption of Children in
Accordance with Ancient Maori Custom, 57 J. POLYNESIAN SOC’Y 268, 268 (1948) (describing Maori
customs). The government of New Zealand still recognizes informal adoption by families and clans as
Whangai. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, WHANGAI (2020), https://www.govt.nz/browse/familyand-whanau/adoption-and-fostering/whangai/ [https://perma.cc/CQX2-2FYP].
246. Astrid Anderson, Adoption and Belonging in Wogeo, Papua New Guinea, in CROSS-CULTURAL
APPROACHES TO ADOPTION 135, 135 (Fiona Bowie ed., 2004).
247. Erdmute Alber, “The Real Parents Are the Foster Parents”: Social Parenthood Among the Baatombu
in Northern Benin, in CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ADOPTION, supra note 246, at 33.
248. Faisal Kutty, Islamic “Adoptions”: Kafalah, Raadah, Istilhaq and the Best Interests of the Child in
THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION DEBATE: DIALOGUES ACROSS DISCIPLINES 526, 539 (Robert L.
Ballard, Naomi H. Goodno, Robert F. Cochran & Jay A. Milbrandt eds., 2015).
249. Id. at 551; see also Andrea Büchler & Eveline Schneider Kayasseh, Fostering and Adoption in
Islamic Law—Under Consideration of the Laws of Morocco, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, 6 ELEC.
J. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L. 31, 40–42 (2018) (describing Kafalah’s status in classical and
modern Islamic law). See generally Marcia C. Inhorn, “He Won’t Be My Son”: Middle Eastern Muslim
Men’s Discourses of Adoption and Gamete Donation, 20 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 94 (2006) (detailing
interviews with Middle Eastern Muslim Men on their attitudes toward adoption and gamete donation).
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between children and biological family even after adoption.250 Yet some may
argue that these practices neither translate in the United States, nor do they
represent legally recognized parental status.
France’s practice of adoption simple may suggest possibilities that answer
those critiques. France has a centuries-old history of adoption as addition, not
subtraction.251 Since 1804, France has recognized adoption simple, a form of
“additive filiation,” where a person is made legally a member of one family
without cutting off ties from the biological family.252 Initially, the purpose of
such adoptions was to facilitate inheritance, and adoption simple was restricted to
the adoption of adults.253 But following World War I, which left many children
parentless and many parents childless, French law was modified to allow for
adoption simple of minors as well.254 Thus, adoption simple “was no longer only a
matter of finding an heir for a family, but also a child to be raised.”255 When
adoption simple was available only for the adoption of adults, the numbers
remained steady at approximately 100 per year.256 With the change to allow
adoption of minors after World War I, the numbers increased ten- to twentyfold to 1,000–2,500 yearly.257 While the numbers may appear small, this is
against a yearly plenary adoption figure that never exceeded 5,000 during that
same time period.258 The focus of adoption simple had changed with the addition
of adoption of minors, from the needs of the adoptive parents—to transmit an
estate—to the “interests of the adoptee—in order to give the child loving
parents.”259
By 1939, France had also created another form of adoption—“plenary
adoption”—that severed completely the ties between biological family and
250. See supra notes 226–41 and accompanying text (detailing this research).
251. See Laura J. Schwartz, Models for Parenthood in Adoption Law: The French Conception, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1069, 1090 (1995) (noting reasons why French “families formed by adoption cannot
‘pass’ as biological ones”).
252. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 366. This form of adoption also exists in
Belgium, Françoise-Romaine Ouellette, The Social Temporalities of Adoption and the Limits of Plenary
Adoption, in INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AND THE CIRCULATION OF
CHILDREN 69, 69–70 (Diana Marre & Laura Briggs eds., 2009), and Italy, Jean-François Mignot,
Adoption in France and Italy: A Comparative History of Law and Practice (Nineteenth to Twenty-First
Centuries), 70 POPULATION 759, 759 (2015).
253. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 366–67.
254. Id. at 367; Pierre Verdier, ‘Limited Adoption’ in France, 12 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 41, 41
(1988) (noting that simple adoption is “possible at any age”).
255. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 367.
256. Id. at 370.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 370 fig.1. Schwartz reports that “[a]s of 1990, an average of 3,800 adoptions plénières and
2,300 adoptions simples are pronounced each year.” Schwartz, supra note 251, at 1096 n.140.
259. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 368.
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adopted child.260 Plenary adoption looks much like the form of adoption familiar
to those in the United States.
Full adoption completely severs the ties between the adoptee and his
often-unknown family of origin: the adoptee replaces the name and the
inheritance he would have from his family of origin with those he takes from
his adoptive family (substitutive filiation). Nowadays, the main reason to adopt
in the full adoption form is for a sterile adopter or for those for whom assisted
reproductive technology has failed to satisfy their desire to raise a child and to
love and be loved by them.261
The implementation of plenary adoption may have been motivated by a
perceived reluctance of adoptive parents to adopt through adoption simple and
maintain those bonds between the adoptee and their family of origin.262
Completely divorcing the child from the biological family was perhaps more
palatable to some adoptive parents. In one descriptive article about child welfare
policies and adoption in France, the authors opine that
[e]xcept for intra-family adoption, simple adoption does not work very
well and is not very often employed: above all, it concerns children with
mentally ill parents and children in permanent placement with foster
families[.] It can be problematic for children in long-term care with very
antisocial or disturbed parents: Who will protect the adoptive family if
there are conflicts with the birth parents?263
There is no support offered for this proposition, but it tends to be in line
with ideas about open adoption and birth parent involvement that have been
largely debunked in U.S. studies.264

260. Id.; Ouellette, supra note 252, at 69 (plenary adoption makes the child a “legal stranger to his
or her birth parents”).
261. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 368.
262. Id. There is little data to substantiate this concern, but there is certainly evidence that adoptive
parents may choose types of adoption that eliminate continuing contact with birth family. See Seymore,
International Adoption, supra note 26, at 165 (noting the choice of adoptive parents to seek international
adoption where no birth parent contact is usually possible in to avoid open adoption with birth parent
involvement domestically).
263. Annick-Camille Dumaret & Dominique-Jeanne Rosset, Adoption and Child Welfare Protection
in France, 175 EARLY CHILD DEV. & CARE 661, 663 (2005).
264. See discussion of open adoption studies at supra notes 226–41 and accompanying text; see also
Brown et al., supra note 227, at 182–83 (noting the persistence of adoption myths, particularly in
adoption from the child welfare system, about birth parents). Of course, there are differences in open
adoption, U.S. style, and adoption simple, of which there are far fewer extant studies.
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But nonetheless, France preserved adoption simple as an alternative as well,
utilized by those who had no interest in severing original parental ties265 or
where doing so was not considered in the best interest of the child.266 Beginning
in the 1970s, with considerable growth in divorce rates in France, there was a
spike in adoption simple attributable to a growth in stepparent adoption.267
Indeed, French literature has suggested that “[o]verall, it appears that simple
adoption is more common today than it has ever been.”268 Indeed, the number
of adoptions simple has increased from about 1,500 per year to approximately
10,000 per year.269 “Stepfamilies often prefer simple adoption because it creates
an adoptive parenthood without erasing the previous one.”270 With adoption
simple, the adoptee adds the family name of the adoptive family but does not
excise the name of the original family.271 And while the adoptive parents have
parental authority, the biological parents still maintain a duty of support of the
child and the child may inherit from both the adoptive parents and the
biological parents.272
One other difference between plenary adoption and adoption simple needs
mention. While plenary adoption is considered irrevocable, French statutes
265. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 368 (“Those now being adopted through
simple adoption are minors or, in particular, adults who are not abandoned or orphaned, and who have
no interest in seeing their original parental ties being severed.”); Dumaret & Rosset, supra note 263, at
663 (contrasting full and simple adoption: “Full adoption is new parentage through rupture with the
birth family. . . . Simple adoption is an additional parentage”).
266. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 1097 (noting that a French judge, in announcing an adoption simple,
said, “[A]n adoption plénière ‘would accentuate the discrepancy between biological reality and legal
fiction and tend to jeopardize the psycho-emotional equilibrium of the child’” (citation omitted)).
267. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 373 (“[T]he opportunities for stepparents
to adopt their step-children are increasing, so much so that the number of simple adoptees has crossed
a second threshold: it has gone up from about 1,500 to about 10,000 per year.”).
268. Id.
269. Id. But see Dumaret & Rosset, supra note 263, at 663 (“Except for intra-family adoption,
simple adoption does not work very well and is not very often employed.”). The 10,000 simple
adoptions a year are a stark contrast to the number of full adoptions in France. According to Mignot,
at about this same time, approximately 3,000 international adoptions to France occurred annually, and
only 731 children annually were adopted from foster care. Jean-Francois Mignot, Full Adoption in
England and Wales and France: A Comparative History of Law and Practice (1926–2015), 41 ADOPTION &
FOSTERING 142, 151–52 (2017).
270. Jean-Francois Mignot, Stepfamilies in France Since the 1990s: An Interdisciplinary Overview, in
THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF STEPFAMILIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN LEGAL,
RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL ENVIRONMENTS 53, 71 (Jan Pryor ed., 2008) [hereinafter Mignot,
Stepfamilies in France].
271. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 1094. Schwartz contends that adoption simple evidences France’s
commitment to biological parent-child relationships, as does France’s commitment to destigmatize
unwed parenthood, provide financial and social support of single mothers, and allow a three-month
time period within which a placing birth mother may revoke her consent to adoption. Id. at 1082–89,
1095.
272. Id. at 1094–95.
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allow for the termination of an adoption simple.273 However, revocation is only
permitted upon a showing of serious cause.274 This requirement of justification
for termination of an adoption simple means that U.S. immigration requirements
of permanency of adoption are satisfied by a French adoption simple.275
Despite these many changes in adoption in France, adoption simple still
involves the adoption of adults more than the adoption of children. In the first
years in which data about age was available, 1968–1970, almost all simple
adoptees were adults. Between 1992 and 2007, eighty-five percent of simple
adoptees were adults.276 And ninety-two percent of adoptions simple involve a
stepparent adopting a stepchild.277 These figures, however, may not paint a fully
accurate picture of the use of adoption simple. For example, adoption simple may
be utilized in some international adoptions to France. If the consent of the birth
parent in the sending country was to an adoption simple, then the only allowable
form of adoption in France would be an adoption simple.278 There is also
anecdotal evidence that adoption simple is used in family creation beyond these
parameters. Consider the story of Amelie and Francoise, a lesbian couple who
desired to become parents in France.279 A friend offered to place a child with
them, and Amelie’s brother listed himself as the father on the birth certificate
of the child. Amelie then used adoption simple to become the legal mother of the
child.280 While it may appear that this is a family adoption—Amelie adopted
the child of her brother—factually that is not what happened. But by using

273. Id. at 1095.
274. Dumaret & Rosset, supra note 263, at 663.
275. 16 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE AFM 21.15(c)(3) (2020) (“Even if a ‘simple
adoption’ might be more easily terminated than a ‘full’ adoption, that alone does not mean the simple
adoption does not create a ‘permanent’ relationship.”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 5
POLICY MANUAL ch. 4, A(4) (2021) (“A simple adoption may be valid for immigration purposes if it
meets the definition of an adoption for immigration purposes and the parent-child relationship cannot
be terminated for other than serious or grave reasons.”).
276. Mignot, Simple Adoption in France, supra note 21, at 372–73.
277. Id. at 375.
278. Schwartz, supra note 251, at 1097. This position is consistent with the Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, which will not allow
for a form of adoption in the receiving country absent the birth parents’ consent in the sending country.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, art. 4,
May 29, 1993, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 08-401; see also Stephanie Zeppa, “Let Me In, Immigration
Man”: An Overview of Intercountry Adoption and the Role of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 22
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 179–80 (1998).
279. Anne Cadoret, Mothers for Others: Between Friendship and the Market, in INTERNATIONAL
ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AND THE CIRCULATION OF CHILDREN 271–73 (Diana Marre
& Laura Briggs eds., 2009).
280. Id.
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adoption simple the biological mother, Amelie, and her brother all share legal
rights in, and legal responsibilities to, the child.
It is notable that despite the passage of legislation authorizing full or
plenary adoption, adoption simple still exists in robust numbers in France. And
the primary feature of adoption simple, the addition of parents rather than the
subtraction of parents, remains a possibility for those who are not interested in
divorcing the child from their first family.
C.

Quebec and Adoption Simple

Inspired by France’s adoption simple, and motivated by a recognition that
maintaining connections in adoption was important, Quebec sought to create a
system where the birth family maintained legal connection to the child even
after adoption.281 In doing so, the proposed method of adoption would “derogate
from the prevailing understanding by which Quebec law recognizes at most two
parents.”282 Though the reforms stalled and were never passed,283 the experience
has some lessons to impart.
Proposed by the Minister of Justice to the Quebec National Assembly in
October 2009, the legislation sought to strike a balance between the benefits of
adoption for children who needed a loving family with the financial security to
meet their needs and the benefits of continuity with biological family and
healthy identity formation.284 The proposed law suggested that maintaining
family filiation would be particularly worthwhile when the child was older at
the time of adoption or when the adoption was by a stepparent or other family
member.285 The purpose of the method proposed in Quebec was to preserve in
law what is true in fact—that the child has a preexisting connection to the birth
family. “The enduring filial status would allow the adoptee to say to the birth
parents, with the law’s imprimatur, ‘You are still my mother’ or ‘You are still
my father.’”286
In Quebec the proposed adoption simple would leave intact the prior
filiation of child and birth family, as does French adoption simple, and also
preserve the French model of continuing support obligations for the birth

281. Françoise-Romaine Ouellette & Alain Roy, Prendre Acte des Nouvelles Réalités de L’adoption
[Take Note of the New Realities of Adoption], 44 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 7, 15 (2010); Robert Leckey,
Identity, Law, and the Right to a Dream?, 38 DALHOUSIE L.J. 525, 535 (2015).
282. Leckey, supra note 281, at 536.
283. Id. at 534.
284. Ouellette & Roy, supra note 281, at 26.
285. Id.
286. Leckey, supra note 281, at 536 (citation omitted).
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parents.287 But some opined that it would be unfair to saddle birth parents with
duties, like the duty of support, without also imparting reciprocal rights.288 A
second proposed Quebec model, therefore, would not maintain any of the rights
and duties of parenthood for the birth parents that French adoption simple would
provide, including the duty of support.289 In addition to the purported
unfairness, there was fear that a support obligation would discourage birth
parents from placing the child for adoption if that liability would nonetheless
continue.290
The Quebec proposal seems grounded in a belief of the symbolic force of
law. Maintaining family filiation, rather than the rupture traditional adoption
caused, speaks to a societal recognition, given the force of law, of the importance
of continuity for the adopted person and the relevance of those connections in
identity formation. As Ouellette and Roy put it:
The relationship of filiation is constituted by the concrete practices of
the actors, but also by symbolic references. In our cultural context, it
would be absurd to claim that the persistence of the bond between the
original parents and the child is not important to him, especially when
this bond structured his first years of life. At a time when personal
identities are composite, fluctuating, often built on the crossing of
borders between genders, ethnic groups, cultures, it is necessary to
distance ourselves from the norm of exclusivity in adoption and to allow
ourselves to a margin of play in the definition of kinship. Especially since
we know how to do it in other circumstances, as the blended families
testify.291
The efforts to pass the legislation in Quebec may well have failed because
of concerns of adoptive parents who cannot accept the idea of adopting without
breaking the original bond; many adoptive parents may not be able to accept
not being the only parents of the child.292 Yet the growth of open adoption is
suggestive of the ability of adoptive parents to make changes to traditional
norms of adoption when they see the benefits of maintaining connections in
adoption. The law can have substantial effects in setting social norms and
expectations, so a law that permits the reality of more than two parents may
well gain social acceptance in the way that open adoption has.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Ouellette & Roy, supra note 281, at 26.
Id.
See Leckey, supra note 281, at 536.
Ouellette & Roy, supra note 281, at 30–31.
Id. at 42.
See id. at 43.
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California Permits More than Two Parents

In 2015, California passed legislation permitting more than two parents
for a child:
(b) “Parent and child relationship” as used in this part means the legal
relationship existing between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive
parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. . . .
(c) This part does not preclude a finding that a child has a parent and
child relationship with more than two parents.293
It was not easily passed—the first attempt to pass the bill was stymied
when Governor Brown vetoed the bill, saying, “I am sympathetic to the author’s
interest in protecting children, but I am troubled by the fact that some family
law specialists believe the bill’s ambiguities may have unintended consequences.
I would like to take more time to consider all of the implications of this
change.”294 However, in the next legislative session the bill was passed and
Governor Brown signed it into law.295 In passing the bill, the Senate made the
following statement of legislative intent:
(a) Most children have two parents, but in rare cases, children have more
than two people who are that child’s parent in every way. Separating a
child from a parent has a devastating psychological and emotional impact
on the child, and courts must have the power to protect children from
this harm. . . .
(c) This bill does not change any of the requirements for establishing a
claim to parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act. It only clarifies
that where more than two people have claims to parentage, the court
may, if it would otherwise be detrimental to the child, recognize that the
child has more than two parents.
(d) It is the intent of the Legislature that this bill will only apply in the
rare case where a child truly has more than two parents, and a finding

293. Act of Oct. 3, 2013, ch. 564, § 5.5, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. Cal. Stat. 4627, 4629 (codified as
amended at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601(c) (2014)).
294. Mike Roe & Julie Small, Gov. Brown Vetoes Bill That Would Have Allowed Legal Recognition for
More Than 2 Parents, KPCC (Sept. 30, 2012), https://www.scpr.org/blogs/news/2012/09/30/10241/govbrown-vetoes-bill-allowing-legal-recognition-m/ [https://perma.cc/YCX8-UGDC].
295. Patrick McGreevy & Melanie Mason, Brown Signs Bill To Allow Children More Than Two Legal
Parents, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-oct-04-lame-brown-bills-parents-20131005-story.html [https://perma.cc/C7EQ-8SZ9 (dark archive)].
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that a child has more than two parents is necessary to protect the child
from the detriment of being separated from one of his or her parents.296
It seems that the legislature expected it to be only in rare and exceptional cases
that a child would have more than two legal parents.
Further, the legislature wanted the permissive requirement to be used only
to make legal what had already existed in fact—a child with more than two
adults who had acted as parents to the child. In offering guidance, the legislature
added the following to their statute on who would qualify as a parent:
In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons
with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds
that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In
determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant
factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child
from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s
physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and affection,
and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding
of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any
of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.297
The state senator who wrote the bill was motivated by a California case
where a child ended up in foster care because her two legal mothers could not
care for her and the court would not recognize her biological father as a legal
parent.298 In In re M.C.,299 the intermediate appellate court found itself bound
by the California Supreme Court’s previous rejection of three parents: “[W]hat
we considered and rejected in Johnson was the argument that a child could have
three parents: a father and two mothers.”300 The court further suggested that it
was up to the legislature to change that,301 an invitation ultimately accepted by
California lawmakers.302 The court also opined that if it had the power to grant
recognition to three parents that this would not have been an appropriate case

296. Act of Oct. 3, 2013 § 1, at 4627–28.
297. Act of Sept. 28, 2018, ch. 876, § 47, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. Cal. Stat. 5654, 5674 (codified as
amended at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2014)).
298. Paula Gerber & Phoebe Irving Lindner, Birth Certificates for Children with Same-Sex Parents:
A Reflection of Biology or Something More?, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 260–61 (2015). That
case was In re M.C., 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (2011).
299. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (2011).
300. Id. at 214 (citing Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 108, 119–20 (2005); In re Jesusa
V., 32 Cal. App. 4th 588, 603 (2004); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 84, 90 (1993); Kristine H.
v. Lisa R., 37 Cal. App. 4th 156, 166 (2005)).
301. See id.
302. Act of Oct. 3, 2013, ch. 564, § 5.5, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. Cal. Stat. 4629 (codified as amended
at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601(c) (2014)).
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in which to do so since the biological father had not developed a relationship
with the child prior to the custody determination.303
In C.A. v. C.P.,304 the court recognized that the new statute abrogated In
re M.C.305 The first line of the opinion in C.A. v. C.P. presages the result of the
new law: “This case involves a little girl bonded to and loved by each of her
three parents.”306 The biological mother and her husband were raising the child,
while acknowledging that another man was the biological father.307 The other
man was fully involved in the child’s life, had held the child out as his own, and
his close family members had also developed a relationship with the child.308
The biological father had participated in medical decision-making for the child
as well.309 The court upheld the trial court’s judgment that “declares that the
child has three parents who shall share custody, with mediation to resolve any
conflicts, and also adds plaintiff’s last name to the child’s existing set of names,
though not as her last name.”310
The California statute seeks to formalize already existing functional coparenting relationships of more than two parties. That may apply in some
situations of adoption where birth parents and adoptive parents are coparenting, including stepparent adoption cases, but it does not answer the
normative question of whether all adoption relationships should be designed to
maintain connections between birth parents and adopted children through a
formalized parenting relationship. Nonetheless, the ability to recognize more
than two legal parents opens the door to such relationships.
IV. THE REALITY OF MORE THAN TWO: CONCERNS AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
There is much good that can come from the legal recognition of more than
two parents. A legally recognized stepparent, for example, can consent to
medical treatment and thus the sole legal parent would not need to shoulder
every doctor’s visit. The legally recognized second parent can pick the child up
from school, register the child for volleyball, and sign the field trip permission

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

In re M.C., 195 Cal. App. 4th at 214.
29 Cal. App. 5th 27 (2018).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 30.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
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slip.311 Some of these might seem like small things, but a legal co-parent can
make life easier for both parents and the child. This Article has already
discussed the importance of continuity of contact and identity formation as a
“good” from adding, rather than subtracting, legal parents, but there are perhaps
other more concrete benefits as well.
In the United States, parents are the social safety net for children. From
the time of Blackstone, it has been understood that parents have an obligation
to support their children.312 The discourse surrounding child welfare payments
makes clear that the parents are the first line of defense against poverty313—
child support enforcement is supposed to prevent children from needing
welfare and thus save the government coffers. As one commentator puts it
bluntly, “[C]hild support enforcement is an anti-dependency measure.
Politicians want to enforce child support orders because they are worried that
the country is spending too much money on welfare . . . .”314 With parents as
the first line of support for children, the more legal parents with obligations of
support the better, no?
Potential concerns about multiplying the number of parents for each child
involve confusion and destabilization for children, destroying appropriate
conceptions of family, and producing family conflict. Those who generally
oppose more than two parents assert that children will be confused by family
forms that do not match biological families with one mother and one father.315
They suggest that changing the concept of family so significantly would
interfere with traditional marriage and limit traditional parental rights.316 And,
311. Sarah E.C. Malia, Balancing Family Members’ Interests Regarding Stepparent Rights and
Obligations: A Social Policy Challenge, 54 FAM. RELS. 298, 301 (2005) (noting that “even if the custodial
parent wishes to grant his/her spouse authority to act on the child’s behalf, a stepparent cannot validly
sign permission slips or make decisions that can be honored by medical personnel and schools about a
child’s medical treatment, class field trip participation, or the like . . .”).
312. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS
446 (George Sharswood ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2011) (n.d.). Blackstone states that the duty of
parents—even to their “bastard children”—is “principally that of maintenance.” Id. at 458.
313. Appleton, supra note 4, at 20 (noting that “family law expresses a strong preference for private
support of children” and that “increasing the number of recognized parents offers more resources and
a more effective buffer against dependence on the state”).
314. Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early
American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1124 (1999).
315. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, The Law’s Duty To Promote the Kinship System: Implications for
Assisted Reproductive Techniques and for Proposed Redefinitions of Familial Relations, 29 BYU J. PUB. L.
389, 422–23 (2015) (criticizing the uncertainty of parentage which would result from assisted
reproductive technologies and three-parent statutes like California’s).
316. See, e.g., Stanley Kurtz, Heather Has 3 Parents, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 12, 2003, 2:00 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/03/heather-has-3-parents-stanley-kurtz/ [https://perma.cc/YH
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anecdotally, when I have discussed the possibility of more than two parents for
a child, the first response from others has been concern for how such
relationships would be managed in light of potential conflicts between
parents.317 Noted family law scholar Brian Bix describes some of these
arguments as “the bogeyman of three (or more) parents.”318 This section will
address these concerns and suggest some ways to ameliorate them.
A.

Confusion & Disruption

One argument against a multiplicity of parents is that the situation would
be confusing to children who would be unable to identify who their “real”319
parents are, and profoundly destabilizing because more than two parents are
indicative of too much change in a child’s life. This echoes an argument made
about putting children in day care—that they will no longer know who their
mothers are when someone else is providing daily care.320 Professor Bix sees
some of these arguments as thinly disguised concern about same-sex couples
and third-party egg and sperm donors,321 where even without the third party’s
involvement some are concerned about the confusion they presume children
will experience when they have two mommies or two daddies.322
Children in America today live in far more complex family forms than was
once the case. A recent study recounts the change in diversity and complexity

5Q-LEW8] (“Once we cross the border into legalized multiple parenthood, we have virtually arrived
at the abolition of marriage and the family.”); see also infra notes 340–56 and accompanying text.
317. See infra notes 368–69 and accompanying text.
318. See generally Brian H. Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or More) Parents (Aug. 1, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
319. It seems clear that this critique is identifying “real” parents as those two parents who are the
biological progenitors of the child. In describing situations in which three persons could be
biological/genetic parents, Professor FitzGibbon claims it would lead to chaotic outcomes, as “[p]ersons
who are uncertain as to their parentage are therefore uncertain as to their entire families.” FitzGibbon,
supra note 315, at 423.
320. See Colleen Cancio, Will My Baby Prefer the Nanny Over Me?, HOW STUFF WORKS,
https://lifestyle.howstuffworks.com/family/parenting/parenting-tips/baby-prefer-the-nanny.htm [htt
ps://perma.cc/86HW-9D37] (advising parents on how to deal with the problems that “arise when a
baby begins to show a preference for the nanny over his or her parents”).
321. See Bix, supra note 318, at 4.
322. Selena E. Van Horn, “How Do You Have Two Moms?” Challenging Heteronormativity While
Sharing LGBTQ-Inclusive Children’s Literature, 27 TALKING POINTS 2, 4 (2020) (noting the belief of
some that children are “too young” to learn about gay and lesbian parenting). The so-called “Don’t Say
Gay” legislation in Florida rests on the assumption that young children (in grades kindergarten through
third grade, according to the statute) should not be exposed to information about sexual orientation or
gender identity. See H.B. 1557, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2022) (“Classroom instruction by school
personnel or third parties on sexual orientation or gender identity may not occur in kindergarten
through grade 3 or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students
in accordance with state standards.”).
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of family structures in today’s children’s experience: “The structure of
adolescents’ families, and thus parental forms, in the United States, have
become more heterogeneous and fluid over the past several decades. These
changes are due to increases in never-married, single parents, divorce,
cohabitation, same-sex parenting, multipartnered fertility, and co-residence
with grandparents.”323 One researcher terms current families with divorce,
remarriage and repartnering as “serial polygamy,” or “polygamy on the
installment plan.”324 Children have managed these situations of multiple
caregivers without undue confusion about who is entitled to be considered a
parent to them.
A study of children whose parents are in concurrent (as opposed to serial)
polyamorous relationships also suggests the ability of children to manage
complex family arrangements without undue confusion.325 They are likely to
identify as parental figures those who have been in their lives since they were
babies or toddlers and who live with them.326 Shorter term involvement, or
those who did not cohabit with them were seen “as a chosen family member
akin to an aunt, uncle, cousin, or older sibling.”327 There might be complexity
relating to stepsiblings and half siblings in polyamorous families, as there are in
monogamous families as well.328
Concerns about confusion pervaded early arguments against open
adoption as well. Opponents to open adoption argued that adopted children
would have identity confusion over two sets of parents,329 and that is not an
uncommon concern among prospective adoptive parents.330 But one of the most
important longitudinal studies of adoption—the Minnesota/Texas Adoption
323. Lisa D. Pearce, George M. Hayward, Laurie Chassin & Patrick J. Curran, The Increasing
Diversity and Complexity of Family Structures for Adolescents, 28 J. RSCH. ON ADOLESCENCE 591, 591
(2018).
324. Mark Goldfeder & Elisabeth Sheff, Children of Polyamorous Families: A First Empirical Look, 5
J.L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 150, 167–68 (2013).
325. Id. at 198–99.
326. Id. at 199.
327. Id. at 198.
328. Id. at 234 (noting that experiences with stepsiblings tended to mirror “experiences of other
blended families with half- and step-siblings in serial monogamous families”).
329. Adrienne D. Kraft, Joe Palombo, Dorena L. Mitchell, Patricia K. Woods, Anne W. Schmidt
& Nancy G. Tucker, Some Theoretical Considerations on Confidential Adoptions Part III: The Adopted Child,
2 CHILD & ADOLESCENT S. WORK J. 139, 142 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of adopted children to
integrate birth parents in open adoption); Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, 3
FUTURE OF CHILD. 125, 129 (1993) (postulating that open adoption would produce confusion and
divided loyalty between the two sets of parents in the adoptee).
330. See Harold D. Grotevant, Gretchen Miller Wrobel, Lynn Von Korff, Brooke Skinner, Jane
Newell, Sarah Friese & Ruth G. McRoy, Many Faces of Openness in Adoption: Perspectives of Adopted
Adolescents and Their Parents, 10 ADOPTION Q. 79, 96 (2007).
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Research Project331—found that adopted persons in open adoptions experienced
no confusion about who their parents were.332 Most adoptees with the highest
level of contact—face-to-face meetings—described their birth mothers as “a
close or special friend or acquaintance or casual friend;”333 others viewed them
as “a relative, another parent, or playing a ‘birth mother role.’”334 Thus, it
appears the adopted adolescents in this study were able to distinguish the
position of birth parent from adoptive parent.
Professor Bix notes that those who oppose multiple legal parents might
respond as Elizabeth Marquardt did:
Those who have noticed tend to say [situations with multiple parents]
are nothing new, because many children already grow up with several
parent figures. But this fails to recognize that [they] still have only two
legal parents.335
Yes, and if the state granted parental status to more than two, there would not
then be confusion about who the “real” parents are, would there? Of course, if
one conceives of the only “real” parents as biological parents, then the statement
is not simply a normative statement about who should be a parent, it is also one
that discounts adoptive families.
One argument about confusion is that potential parents might also be
confused. They may be uncertain about what their rights are and what their
obligations are vis-à-vis a particular child. Stanly Kurtz argues that
once parental responsibilities are parceled out to more than two
people . . . it becomes easier for any one parent to shirk his or her
responsibilities. The very notion that parents can be added and
subtracted at will tends to cut against the feeling of special responsibility
for a given child.336

331. The study began almost forty years ago and has spawned a huge body of literature on the
long-term effects of various forms of adoption. Id. at 81.
332. Id. at 89.
333. Id. at 88.
334. Id.
335. Bix, supra note 318, at 6 (quoting Elizabeth Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES
(July
16,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/opinion/16marquardt.html
[https://perma.cc/F8HF-LVGC (dark archive)]).
336. Stanley Kurtz, Heather Has 3 Parents, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2003, 2:00 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/03/heather-has-3-parents-stanley-kurtz/ [https://perma.cc/6D
NY-5T9M].] This appears to be a species of the bystander effect problem, where mobs allegedly fail
to intervene where a single person would have done so. Professor Bix suggests facetiously if the
“shirking” argument is valid, it would be best, then, to restrict children to a single parent. Bix, supra
note 318, at 3; see also FitzGibbon, supra note 315, at 422 (arguing, “[p]eople who might consider
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To the extent that there is confusion or ambiguity about the respective roles of
birth parents and adoptive parents, the proposal to allow more than two legal
parents is bound to alleviate rather than produce confusion. It is the undefined
nature of birth parenthood, for example, that is likely to cause confusion.337
Asserting legal status, with defined rights and obligations, would resolve
ambiguity in many ways. If a court ruled that a third person was a parent, and
ordered the payment of child support, one would expect no more shirking than
is the norm in the already epidemic-level problem of nonpayment of child
support.338
Concerns about confusion and dispersion of responsibility compare the
presence of three legally recognized parents to the heteronormative two-parent,
never-divorced biological parents of the hypothetically perfect family. But that
family does not exist for a great number of children.339 Blocking legal
recognition does not change the reality of the existence of such families, it
simply leaves children unprotected by denying parental recognition that could
formalize responsibility for the care and protection of the children. Turning
back the clock to a more idealized time might be attractive but is profoundly
unrealistic now.
B.

Changing Conceptions of Family

Professor Bix sees some of the arguments against three-parent families as
thinly disguised concern about same-sex families, a rear-guard action against
themselves to be parents would be uncertain as to whether they occupy that status; children would be
uncertain of their parentage”).
337. See Deborah Lewis Fravel, Ruth G. McRoy & Harold D. Grotevant, Birthmother Perceptions
of the Psychologically Present Adopted Child: Adoption Openness and Boundary Ambiguity, 49 FAM. RELS.
425, 425 (2000) (suggesting that education to maneuver roles would be helpful for boundary
ambiguity).
338. In fiscal year 2020, the total amount of unpaid child support in arrears was
$115,130,048,828.00. OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
PRELIMINARY
REPORT
FY
2020
91
(2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse/fy_2020_preliminary_data_report.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/45D8-WA66]. Total caseloads for child support enforcement nationwide for that year
was 13,203,628. Id. at 58.
339. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2014, less than fifty percent of children lived in a
two-parent, first marriage household, while twenty-six percent of children lived in single parent
households, fifteen percent with two-parent, remarried households, seven percent lived with
cohabiting, unmarried parents, and five percent had no parents at all in their household. The American
Family Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ [https://perma.cc/5T4J-SFR7]. Additionally, “[m]ore
than 125,000 same-sex couple households (19%) include nearly 220,000 children under age 18.” GARY
J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Feb. 2013),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting-Feb-2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7ZCN-K4GG].
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gay marriage.340 For others, the argument is simply against anything different
from the conventional two-parent family of earlier times; Scott FitzGibbon
argues that the state has a role in enforcing kinship status when it is a social
good, and that it is a social good only in its traditional formulation.341 He finds
little positive value in families that involve multiple parenting structures or
assisted reproductive technology that creates claims for biological parenthood
beyond two parents.342 This seems to be the crux of the argument for much
opposition to legally recognize more than two parents. Anything that changes
the typical biological dyad of two parents runs the risk of destroying the family
as we know it.343
Professor Bix notes that the bogeyman of the three-parent debate “quickly
leads back to that other bogeyman: polygamy.”344 Yet more than two parents
does not make more than two marriage partners inevitable any more than two
parents has made marriage and parenting coterminous today.345 While there is
an assumption that polygamous families often exhibit harmful characteristics
such as violence and exploitation,346 studies suggest “that these abuses are caused
by ‘particularly dysfunctional’ polygynist families rather than problems
inherent to polygyny.”347 In other words, having more than two parents is not
the problem. Studies show that polyamorous families can raise successful, welladjusted children.348
Concerns about changing the nature of the family might be asserted as a
violation of constitutionally protected parental and marriage rights. In C.A. v.
C.P., the California case where a married couple resisted recognition of the
biological father as a legal parent, the couple asserted that the state was required
to protect marriage and that recognizing the third parent would diminish their
constitutionally protected parental rights.349 The court gave these arguments
little weight. While the court agreed that a parent’s right to care, custody, and
340. See Bix, supra note 318, at 6 (“It is hard not to suspect that much of the shocked reaction to
the three parent cases is grounded in the visceral response to both same-sex couples on one hand, and
new reproductive technologies . . . on the other.”).
341. FitzGibbon, supra note 315, at 390–91.
342. Id. at 418–20 (rejecting polyamorous families and three-parent embryos).
343. Bix, supra note 318, at 3.
344. Id. at 3.
345. See Goldfeder & Sheffet, supra note 324, at 177 (“[F]amily law has already disaggregated
marriage from parenting.”).
346. Id. at 162.
347. Id. at 182 (discussing study that suggests “abuses are caused by ‘particularly dysfunctional’
polygynist families rather than problems inherent to polygyny”).
348. Id. at 182–83.
349. C.A. v. C.P., 29 Cal. App. 5th 27, 32 (2018).
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management of a child should not be lightly interfered with by a nonparent, the
court held there was no unwarranted interference with parental rights when the
third person is a parent.350 Indeed, the logical extension of the argument would
otherwise say that each of two parents interfered with the parental rights of the
other parent simply by existing! The only constitutionally valid parental rights
in that formulation would be the undiluted rights of a single parent.
The arguments about the changing nature of family are familiar from the
debates about recognition of gay marriage. In offering constitutional protection
to same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges acknowledged
that those seeking same-sex marriage were not doing so out of a desire to
“demean the revered idea and reality of marriage,” but instead seek it because
of “their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities.”351 The purpose
of such recognition was not to change the family as we know it, but to
acknowledge that the family—as exemplified by marriage—had already changed
profoundly. And the Supreme Court noted that the changes “have
strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.”352 Legal recognition
of more than two parents will, in the same way, further strengthen the reality
of family life.
Adoptive parents may be concerned that recognizing legal status of birth
parents delegitimizes adoptive families by suggesting that biological ties are
superior to adoptive ties.353 It is not a matter of a hierarchy of parentage to
recognize more than two parents, biological and adoptive; it is a recognition of
reality that children see themselves already as existing in two families, each with
a different set of parents.354 Connecting these families aids the child in
grounding their identity and conception of family. And the two-parent limit,
itself, reifies the biological conception of family in a way far more
consequentially harmful for adoptive families. It is, in many ways, setting up
adoptive families for failure—no matter how much an adoptive family may seek
to be “as if” biological, they will never be the biological progenitors of the child.
C.

Conflicts Among Multiple Parents

Opposition to more than two parents often rests on the premise that
additional parents will breed intractable conflicts in parenting. Yet managing

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 43.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657–58 (2015).
Id. at 660.
Ouellette & Roy, supra note 281, at 29.
Id.
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conflicts between parents is a staple of family law. Consider divorce and child
custody: when two parents split up, courts are accustomed to establishing and
regulating the rights and obligations of each parent, and enforcing those rights
and obligations in a number of ways.355 In joint custody arrangements in
particular, the parents might actually have equal decisional rights—each having
a right to decide where a child goes to school, where a child resides, what
medical care a child should receive, and other important decisions.356
Katharine Bartlett describes the rights and duties of parents as “both
exclusive and indivisible.”357 Each parent is entitled to exercise fully each right
and duty of parenthood, even when parenting jointly. But when parents seek
divorce and to adjudicate child custody, the rights and duties in children become
more like that bundle of sticks law students learn in first-year property.358 A
court can divide the parental right of custody and the parental duty of support
between the two parents.359 In joint-custody arrangements, parents may have
equal physical custody rights, as well as equal decision-making rights, or those
rights may be parceled out between them.360
In Texas, for example, parents seeking joint custody can file a joint
parenting plan with the court, which indicates who would have the right to
designate the child’s primary residence, specifies the rights and duties of each
parent for the child’s physical care, support, and education; and “allocate[s]
between the parents, independently, jointly, or exclusively, all of the remaining
rights and duties of a parent.”361 If the parties do not do so, and the court
nonetheless orders joint custody, the court sets forth the division of all the rights

355. J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and
Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 213 (2014). Professor DiFonzo gives an illustration of joint custody
statutes in New Mexico, stating, “[t]he statutory scheme also provides seven options for making
‘decisions regarding major changes in a child’s life.’ These include mediation and family counseling
requirements, allocating final decisional authority on a matter to one party, terminating joint custody,
as well as a binding arbitration and court decision options.” Id. at 223 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 404-9.1 J(5) (2022)).
356. Id. at 222–23.
357. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 883.
358. Laura Kessler touches on this analogy, arguing the need to “disaggregate the bundle of
parental rights” to recognize more than two parents. Kessler, supra note 4, at 74; see also Melanie B.
Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple
Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 325 (2007) [hereinafter Jacobs, Why Just Two?] (making the
argument about strands of parental rights: “By disaggregating the strands of parentage, it becomes
possible to recognize the many individuals who play a role in the child’s life”).
359. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 899.
360. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (Westlaw through the end of the 2021 Reg. and
Called Sess. of the 87th Legislature) (presumption of joint custody).
361. Id. § 153.133(a)(1), (2), (4) (Westlaw).
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and duties of a parent between the petitioning parents.362 Texas is not an
anomaly in this division of parents’ rights and duties upon divorce.363
Like many states, Texas also provides that a custody order should contain
a recommendation that “the parties use an alternative dispute resolution method
before requesting enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of
the joint conservatorship through litigation.”364 This is in line with the modern
role of family courts in divorce and child custody. Andrew Schepard describes
family law courts today as “conflict managers rather than fault finders,” with
courts as
the apex of a multifaceted dispute resolution system that encourages outof-court agreement on parenting plans. Court-affiliated education
programs, mediation, and legal rules which reward post divorce and
separation cooperation between parents are the core of a newly created
settlement culture, and trials are a last resort for particularly troublesome
cases.365
California takes to heart the role of the court as manager of child custody
disputes, having mandated the mediation of such disputes since 1981.366
Mediation has proven very successful in resolving custody disputes. Nancy
Welsh writes, “[r]esearch has affirmed that divorce and child custody mediation
results in higher rates of compliance, fewer returns to the courts with postdivorce disputes, and more significant relationships between children and both
of their parents.”367 And mediation is not the only alternative to litigation to
solve custody disputes. Professor Welsh identifies a number of processes courts
have used to avoid litigation and solve custody disputes, including conflict
resolution conferences that are more directive than mediation, hybrid processes
that include negotiation and agreements but may include information gathering
and assessments for recommendations to the court, and collaborative or

362. Id. § 153.134(a) (Westlaw).
363. See Bartlett, supra note 4, at 899 (“The law assumes that both parents will continue to have
relationships with the child and that they will divide parental duties and responsibilities.”).
364. § 153.134(b)(5) (Westlaw).
365. Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to
Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 396 (2000).
366. Sofya Perelshteyn, Mediator or Judge?: California’s Mandatory Mediation Statute in Child Custody
Disputes, 17 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 2 (2017). Whether mandatory mediation is appropriate is
beyond the scope of this Article. For many, less than voluntary mediation is not mediation at all.
367. Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from
the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 454 (2009).
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cooperative lawyering.368 There is no reason to believe that these alternatives
are not capable of resolving disputes when more than two parents are involved.
Indeed, in C.A. v. C.P, the California court recognized the third parent also
required mediation to resolve any disputes.369
Open adoption agreements, while often not legally enforceable, may have
enforcement mechanisms in some jurisdictions.370 Texas, for example, allows for
legal enforcement of some such arrangements.371 But Texas also requires that
the parties try mediation before seeking legal enforcement.372 This further
emphasizes that tools already exist to mitigate the concerns about conflicts
between more than two parents—the same tools that solve conflicts between
two parents.
Conflicts could be reduced by legislative choices as well. Recall that the
final Quebec proposal for more than two parents limited the rights and
obligations of birth parents so that they would not have an obligation to provide
child support and had no rights of authority over the child.373 And in France
adoption simple allocates parental authority to the adoptive parents, but imposes
obligations of support and inheritance on birth parents.374 Rather than leave the
decision about how to allocate authority between multiple parents to judges on
a case-by-case basis, the legislature could set out specific rights or limitations
on rights for parents with varying statuses. While the case-by-case method is
already utilized in conflicting parenting between two parents—and is likely to
be able to better handle individual family differences—there are potential and
viable legislative solutions to conflicts of this sort.
Concerns about more than two parents gaining legal recognition are
premised on an idealized form of family that exists for few children today.
Whether or not other adults are recognized as legal parents, they are already
368. Id. at 456–57. See generally John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT.
REV. 280 (2004) (comparing and contrasting various alternative methods to resolve divorce cases,
including child custody).
369. C.A. v. C.P., 29 Cal. App. 5th 27, 32 (2018); see also id. at 44 (noting that the third parent
“treated the child as his daughter with the consent of defendants.” (emphasis added)).
370. Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 182–83; Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra
note 9, at 151–53.
371. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061(a) (Westlaw through the end of the 2021 Reg. and Called
Sess. of the 87th Legislature).
372. Id. § 161.2061(c) (Westlaw) (“The terms of an order of termination regarding limited posttermination contact may be enforced only if the party seeking enforcement pleads and proves that,
before filing the motion for enforcement, the party attempted in good faith to resolve the disputed
matters through mediation.”).
373. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
374. Id.
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important to children in stepparent families, in families created through assisted
reproductive technology, and in adoptive families. Legal recognition would
offer less confusion because it would further define familial roles. It would offer
more protection for the family as legal obligations and rights became clear.
Finally, legal recognition of more than two parents would provide a formalized
process for dispute resolution that has always been utilized for families of
divorce. Recognizing the reality of children’s already-complicated family lives
is in their best interests.
D.

Private Ordering and More Than Two Parents

If individuals wish to establish groups larger than two people to raise
children together, and to each be called parent without the assistance of the state
to recognize parental rights and enforce them, they would be free to make such
a private arrangement. But multiple parents may run up against the traditional
reluctance of family law to recognize private ordering if they seek state
enforcement of their private agreement.375 The traditional view of private
ordering in family law demands that the state establishes the exclusive
“contract” of marriage and parentage. Once a family was created, the state
decided the terms of the marital contract, including the ability to terminate the
contract by divorce, financial responsibilities upon divorce, and the like.376 And
with children, the state also set the terms of the contract of parenthood,
including who was recognized as a parent and what the rights and duties of
parents would be.377
But today, private ordering in family law is not unusual: “One can speak
of premarital agreements, marital agreements, separation agreements, open
adoption agreements, co-parenting agreements, agreements on the disposition
of frozen embryos, and agreements to arbitrate disputes arising out of any of
the above agreements.”378 Adoption today, like other areas of family law, is a
mix of legal ordering and private ordering.379 The state reserves the right to
375. Private ordering in family law occurs when individuals make “private arrangements to alter
the legal rules surrounding family status.” Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 249, 249 (2010) [hereinafter Bix, Private Ordering].
376. Id.; see also Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1446
(1992) (“Traditionally, the legal principles governing marriage and consensual alternatives to marriage
reflected a strong preference in favor of public ordering of behavior.”).
377. Bix, Private Ordering, supra note 375, at 249; see also Singer, supra note 377, at 1478 (discussing
the shift from public to private ordering in the context of adoption).
378. Bix, Private Ordering, supra note 375, at 249.
379. See generally Amanda C. Pustilnik, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children:
A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2002). In fact, Pustilnik argues
that adoption is “nonstatutory, with deep private-ordering roots in contract law.” Id. at 264.
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determine who may adopt and to define the adoptive family.380 Yet many other
aspects involve private ordering. Jana Singer finds proof that adoption is
shifting to private ordering from the “change in the perceived purpose of
American adoption law, from promoting the welfare of children in need of
parents—traditionally and unproblematically a ‘public’ function—to fulfilling
the needs and desires of couples who want children.”381 She notes the growth of
private placement adoption, where prospective adoptive parents advertise for
birth mothers and make their own arrangements to adopt a child.382 The state’s
involvement is minimal, as the parties contact each other over the internet or
in other ways,383 contract with a private social worker for a home study, and
accept placement of the child before any state intervention.384 It is only later
that the prospective adoptive parents go to court for a legal order of adoption.
Private ordering also extends to open adoption agreements, where the
parties may agree to continuing contact in derogation of legal rules that hold
that birth parents whose rights have been terminated do not have any right to
continuing contact, as they are legal strangers to their children.385 Courts were
once quite reluctant to enforce open adoption agreements, accepting that “the
parties had no power to alter the terms of a state-created status.”386 Now
through legislation and court action, many states provide enforcement of at least
some continuing contact agreements.387
There are many possible variations for operationalizing a new more-thantwo rule in adoption. The simplest is private ordering—at least in cases where
all the parties agree, the state should permit more than two parents. Private
ordering should allow parents who agree to contract for more than two parents.
380. Id. at 264.
381. Singer, supra note 376, 1478.
382. Singer, supra note 376, at 1479; see also Pustilnik, supra note 379, at 287–88 (noting that eightyfive percent of adoptions are transacted privately, with only fifteen percent going through state or
state-regulated agencies).
383. Singer, supra note 376, at 1481; Pustilnik, supra note 379, at 287–88. Those other ways include
through intermediaries like doctors, preachers or lawyers who might come into contact with unwed
mothers considering adoption, or via advertisements in newspapers, particularly on college campuses.
Id. at 1482.
384. Singer, supra note 376, at 1485 n.194 (describing the private placement process as requiring
only a post-placement home study).
385. See Bix, Private Ordering, supra note 375, at 275 (“In recent decades there has been a growing
use and acceptance of ‘open adoption’ agreements, under which the birth parent(s) and the adopting
parent(s) agree that the birth parent(s) can continue to have contact with the child being adopted.”).
But see Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 152 (“In those states with enforceable openadoption agreements, there are complex legal requirements that serve to limit the parties who can enter
into such agreements and to limit the types of adoptions in which such agreements are enforceable.”).
386. Bix, Private Ordering, supra note 375, at 275.
387. Id. at 275–76.
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States, however, need to recognize that the definition of family extends to
multiple-parent families to allow for that legal recognition of such parenting.
Parents can then create a parenting agreement, much like that utilized in the
divorce of two parents, to allocate rights and responsibilities among more than
two parents. Integrating the two families of adopted children—the birth family
and the adoptive family—is, according to the psychosocial literature, in the best
interests of children. Children can then have a family that comports with the
reality of their multidimensional lives and the wishes of all their parents.
CONCLUSION
One of many lessons from the recent COVID-19 pandemic is that
parenting is hard. With parents seeking to balance working, childcare, and the
education of children all at home, it was the unusual parent who did not wish
for additional help and support. Although parents may not have thought to ask
for another parent to join the household, they may have thought that this
description of parenting in a more-than-two-parent household seemed like a
wished-for fantasy:
Whereas a single adult or even two adults with little or no time to
themselves can “burn out,” multiple adults can meet the endless needs of
children without becoming frustrated or insensitive. Children can
benefit from having multiple loving parents who can offer not only more
quality time, but a greater range of interests and energy levels to match
the child’s own unique and growing personality.388
But separate from the “helping hands” dynamic of legal recognition of
more than two parents, there are considerable benefits in the psychosocial
literature about adoption to maintain connections between an adopted child and
their birth families as they grow up in their adoptive families.
The imperative to make the adoptive family closely resemble a biological
family, to seek the justification that the child belongs because it is “as if” the
child was born to the adoptive family, no longer holds sway. Instead, there is
widespread recognition that adopted children are part of two separate and
distinct family groups—one preexisting the adoption and the other created by
the adoption. Even when there is a legal rupture, the absent birth parents

388. Goldfeder et. al, supra note 324, at 187. The idealized description may not be fully accurate,
of course. The study authors note that polyamorous families have a vested interest in “portraying their
polyamorous families as ‘perfect.’” Id. at 195. It is a way to distance themselves for the stigma often
experienced by sexual minorities. Still, there is an innate logic to this claim, though on balance there
may be negatives not accounted for.
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remain salient in the child’s imagination. And reality is more psychologically
stabilizing than a legal fiction that the child had no origins before the adoption
paperwork was signed.
Legal erasure is not an inevitable consequence of adoption—it is a chosen
and accepted consequence of how adoption is practiced in the United States. It
was built on a foundation that is no longer accepted as being in the best interest
of children. It can be changed; after all, the experience of France with adoption
simple tells us that we can change the equation of adoption to one of additive
filiation.
Doing so would not just be good for the children of adoption; it may also
be good for the institution of adoption itself. One issue that plagues adoption
today is that there are more prospective adoptive parents seeking to adopt than
there are available infants to adopt.389 Open adoption initially flourished
because it was thought to motivate birth parents to place their children for
adoption.390 Retaining parental rights may serve that same instrumental
function today. As Candace Zierdt notes, parents are extremely reluctant to
forfeit their parental rights:
In my experience as a guardian ad litem in many contested
adoption/termination of parental right cases, it often appeared that
birthparents contested the termination and adoption not necessarily
because they anticipated or even desired obtaining custody of their child,
but because they believed they loved the child and did not want the child
to think they had not fought for her. Additionally, the idea of being
totally cut off from their child was just too difficult for many parents,
and they could not allow it without a battle. If a parent, however, had a
route which allowed her to keep a legal relationship with the child instead
of abandoning all of her parental rights, perhaps a parent would find it
easier to consent to the adoption.391
This reluctance is also present in many stepparent adoption cases, where
the biological parent is simply unwilling to relinquish parental rights so that a
389. Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 309, 314 (2012) (quoting the National Committee for Adoption commenting on the decline in
1989, “[m]ore than a million couples are chasing the 30,000 white infants available in the country each
year”). Of course, there are other children available for adoption—older children, children from foster
care, sibling groups, children with disabilities, children of color—but there is less competition for these
children, with adoptive parents competing for healthy, white newborns. Michele Goodwin, The FreeMarket Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 63 (2006) (noting
different valuation of fees paid for adoption depending on the race and genetics of a child).
390. See Seymore, International Adoption, supra note 26, at 175 (Early proponents of open adoption
suggested it would encourage reluctant birth mothers to place children for adoption).
391. Candace M. Zierdt, Make New Parents but Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REV. 497, 505 n.43 (1993).
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stepparent can adopt.392 So even when the stepparent is raising the child, they
will have no recognized legal rights as a parent. If we could instead add the
stepparent without subtracting the biological parent, the reality of the child’s
family experience could gain legal recognition, creating a stronger support
network for the child.
While private ordering could provide a partial answer to how to permit
more than two parents, should the state also, through legal ordering, impose
multiple parenthood without full parental agreement? The California statute
recognizing more than two legal parents seeks to do so when already-existing
caregiving relationships are being threatened in a way that is detrimental to the
child.393 The purpose is to give legal recognition to what already exists as a
more-than-two-parents practice. And part of the justification in one case was
that the two already-legal parent had invited or acquiesced to the parenting
relationship of the third parent for many years.394 Others have suggested that
states should recognize such de facto parents.395
Katharine Bartlett argues for recognition of de facto parents, at least in
circumstances where the nuclear family has already been disrupted.396 She
would also require “that the relationship with the child began with the consent
of the child’s legal parent or under court order.”397 The American Law Institute
also suggests recognition in divorce and child custody for parenting by estoppel
and de facto parenthood for those with an already-existing parenting
relationship that commenced with the consent of at least one parent.398 While
the California court did not require disruption of the marriage in order to
recognize a third parent, it did require agreement/acquiescence of the other
parents at the start of the third-parent/child relationship. Other commentators

392. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, § 2.10[3] (noting that while stepparent
adoptions account for over half of all adoptions, they still occur in only a small fraction of households
with a stepparent present, attributing it to the need to sever legal ties with the noncustodial parent who
may wish to remain in the child’s life).
393. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
394. C.A. v. C.P., 29 Cal. App. 5th 27, 44 (2018) (“For over three years [the third parent] treated
the child as his daughter with the consent of defendants.”).
395. See Bartlett, supra note 4, at 946 (arguing for the legal recognition of rights of “psychological
parents,” or “adults who provide for the physical, emotional, and social needs of the child”).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 947.
398. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2002).
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have not relied on the breakup of the nuclear family as justification for
recognition of more than two parents.399
But how should a more-than-two formulation extend to birth parents
whose presence in a child’s life has been more limited, not rising to the level of
de facto parenthood? Private ordering is one answer, and open adoption has
been a mechanism for doing so. But open adoption does not change the status
of the birth parents—they remain legal strangers to the child, allowed
continuing contact only on sufferance by the adoptive parents who are the only
legal parents.
Alison Young argues that allowing all parental rights to exist in only the
adoptive parents essentially makes the birth parents disappear.400 Professor
Young also suggests there should be alternatives to the all-or-nothing
conception of parental rights—a parent has all parental rights, a nonparent has
nothing.401 She envisions parenting relationships where a core parent or
parents—usually the one with physical custody—has decision-making
authority, while other parenting figures have rights to information and access.402
The model of adoption simple in France and the proposed model of adoption in
Quebec incorporate this idea of different rights for different parents, with
adoption simple imposing child support obligations on birth parents but with
adoptive parents maintaining decisional authority.403 While Professor Young
utilizes open adoption as an example of different tiers of parental rights,404 open
adoption as currently practiced does not, in fact, create an enduring parental
status for birth parents. Rather, parental rights of the birth parents are
terminated, leaving them only with potential contractual rights of contact.405

399. See Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive
Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 508–09 (1998) (advocating for recognizing “non-traditional
family units as well as the range of roles potentially played by various actors in the life of a child”);
Appleton, supra note 4, at 15 (examining recent discourse on multi-parentage); Dowd, supra note 4, at
232 (exploring how to recognize multiple fathers); Kessler, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing more-thantwo-parenting, or “community parenting”); Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 4, at 851–52 (arguing for
disaggregation of biological and social paternity to recognize two legal fathers); Jacobs, Why Just Two?,
supra note 359, at 313 (advocating for relative parental rights to recognize all parents in a child’s life).
400. Young, supra note 399, at 544.
401. Id. at 506.
402. Id. at 518.
403. See discussion supra Sections III.B–C.
404. See Young, supra note 399, at 538–39 (noting how open adoptions allow birth mothers to serve
a “supplementary and complementary parental role”).
405. See Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant, supra note 9, at 152–53 (explaining how in Texas, “a postadoption contact agreement is enforceable only if a judge incorporates it in the termination of a parental
rights order”).
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There is value in formalizing the relationship between birth parents,
adoptive parents, and children with recognition that birth parents and adoptive
parents are, indeed, parents of the child. Carl E. Schneider speaks of the
“channelling function” of law, the way in which it “recruits, builds, shapes,
sustains, and promotes social institutions.”406 It does so through its “expressive
function,” employing “the law’s power to impart ideas through words and
symbols.”407 And in doing so, “such symbolic statements can promote changes
in social sentiment which in turn may promote a reformation of social
behavior.”408 The channelling function of the law also creates social institutions,
including marriage and parenthood.409
Legal recognition of a continuing parental relationship between birth
parent and child would channel adoptive and birth families into these
relationships that the social science literature tells us is important to the
development of adopted children. By permitting more than two parents, the
law would signal that families that do not meet the traditional definition of
bionormativity are as valid and deserving of dignity (as Justice Kennedy framed
it in Obergefell) as those who do.410 To quote the Supreme Court, recognition of
parental rights in more than two parents would allow children “to understand
the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives.”411 Without legal
recognition of parenthood for all of their parents, “children suffer the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser.”412
There is value in law as symbol: “[t]he enduring filial status” of birth
parents recognized as legal parents “would allow the adoptee to say to the birth
parents, with the law’s imprimatur, ‘You are still my mother’ or ‘You are still
my father.’”413

406. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496
(1992).
407. Id. at 498.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 500.
410. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
411. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
412. Obergefell, 567 U.S. at 646. Of course, in Obergefell, the Court was speaking of marriage linking
children to families rather than recognition of parental rights, but in fact both marriage and legal
recognition of parental rights are important in creating a legal family.
413. Leckey, supra note 281, at 536.
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